


{"id":6588,"date":"2026-06-22T11:42:27","date_gmt":"2026-06-22T06:12:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/?p=6588"},"modified":"2026-06-22T11:47:35","modified_gmt":"2026-06-22T06:17:35","slug":"how-to-challenge-an-arbitral-award-section-34-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/how-to-challenge-an-arbitral-award-section-34-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"How to Challenge an Arbitral Award (Section 34) 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"<!--\n  How to Challenge an Arbitral Award (Section 34) - VERSION-A\n  WP-paste-ready HTML. Paste directly into the WordPress block editor as\n  Custom HTML or via the Code Editor view.\n  - Slug: how-to-challenge-arbitral-award-section-34\n  - Last verified: 2026-06-22\n  - Schema (Article + FAQPage) is included at the bottom in separate wp:html blocks.\n  - HowTo schema embedded inline below.\n  - VERSION-A: clean (no CTAs \/ Expert Inserts)\n-->\n\n\n<p>Last verified: 2026-06-22<\/p>\n<p>A private concessionaire and a metro operator fought over a city rail line, and the dispute went to arbitration. The concessionaire won big. The award ran into thousands of crores, one of the largest commercial arbitral awards the country had seen. On paper, that should have been the end of the story.<\/p>\n<p>It was not. The metro operator did what any award-debtor with a fighting chance does: it moved to challenge an arbitral award under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. That is the first, time-boxed, narrowly-scoped shot any losing party gets at an Indian arbitral award. And here is where the story turns into a lesson about exactly how narrow that shot is.<\/p>\n<p>The single judge hearing the Sec. 34 petition refused to set the award aside. The court said the tribunal&#8217;s view was a plausible one, and a plausible view is not something a Sec. 34 court disturbs. The operator appealed under Sec. 37 to a Division Bench and made some headway there, with the appellate court trimming part of the award. But the matter went up to the Supreme Court, which in 2021 restored the award in full and held that the courts below had overstepped the narrow scope of Sec. 34 review. The award looked as final as an award can get.<\/p>\n<p>Most stories stop at the apex court. This one did not.<\/p>\n<p>In 2024, the Supreme Court did something it almost never does. It entertained a curative petition, the rarest remedy in Indian procedure, reserved for a sliver of cases where a grave miscarriage of justice would otherwise stand. The court re-examined the very award it had earlier restored, found it perverse and patently illegal at its root, and annulled it. After surviving the Sec. 34 stage and being reinstated at the Supreme Court, the award finally died at the last gate. That was the <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/88353968\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 INSC 292<\/a> saga.<\/p>\n<p>So what does a metro arbitration teach a reader who is staring at an award they want to overturn? Two things, and they pull in opposite directions. First, Sec. 34 interference is genuinely narrow. Courts will not re-run the dispute, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute a &#8220;better&#8221; decision. A losing party who treats Sec. 34 as a second innings on the merits will lose, usually at the threshold. Second, even an award that has run the full gauntlet is not beyond reach if it is truly perverse. The law leaves a door open, but it is a small door, and you have to know exactly where it is.<\/p>\n\n<hr>\n\n<p>If you are on the losing side of an award right now, that door is Sec. 34. It is your first and most important remedy, and it is governed by strict grounds and an unforgiving clock. This guide walks you through both: the grounds on which an award can fall, and the exact steps to file the petition without tripping over the traps that sink most challenges on day one.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Sec. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 lets a party apply to set aside a domestic arbitral award on limited grounds, such as an invalid agreement, denial of a fair hearing, an award beyond the reference, conflict with the public policy of India, or patent illegality. The application must be filed within three months (extendable by 30 days, but not thereafter), and the court cannot re-examine the dispute on its merits.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>That definition packs in the four things that decide most Sec. 34 outcomes: the grounds, the deadline, the no-merits bar, and what the court actually does. The sections below open each one up, then break cleanly into a step-by-step filing workflow you can follow.<\/p>\n\n<hr>\n\n<nav class=\"ls-toc\" aria-label=\"Table of contents\">\n<h2>Table of Contents<\/h2>\n<ol class=\"ls-toc-list\">\n<li><a href=\"#what-is-section-34\">What is Sec. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act?<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#grounds-to-set-aside\">Grounds to set aside an arbitral award under Sec. 34<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#how-courts-narrowed-grounds\">How Indian courts narrowed the grounds: from Saw Pipes to Ssangyong<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#limitation-period\">The limitation period: 3 months, 30 days, &#8220;but not thereafter&#8221;<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#can-court-modify-award\">Can a court modify an arbitral award? Gayatri Balasamy (2025) explained<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#stay-of-enforcement\">Does filing a Sec. 34 petition stop enforcement? The automatic-stay myth<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#how-to-file-section-34-petition\">How to file a Sec. 34 petition: step-by-step<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#section-34-vs-37-vs-36\">Sec. 34 vs Sec. 37 vs Sec. 36: challenge, appeal, enforcement<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#common-mistakes\">Common mistakes when challenging an arbitral award<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#whats-changing-2024-bill\">What&#8217;s changing: the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2024<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#faq\">Frequently asked questions<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#key-takeaways\">Key takeaways<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"#references\">References<\/a>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/nav>\n\n<hr>\n\n<h2 id=\"what-is-section-34\">What is Sec. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act?<\/h2>\n<p>You agreed to arbitration to stay out of court. So why does the law then hand you a route back into court to attack the award? Because arbitration is a private process, and private decision-makers can occasionally get the basics catastrophically wrong: deny a party a hearing, decide a dispute nobody asked them to decide, or produce a result that offends the most basic standards of Indian law. Sec. 34 exists as the safety valve for exactly those situations, and almost nothing else.<\/p>\n<h3>The remedy in one line: set aside, not appeal, not re-trial<\/h3>\n<p>Here&#8217;s the thing most people get wrong from the start. Sec. 34 is not an appeal. An appeal court can re-weigh evidence, re-interpret a contract, and substitute its own conclusion for the lower forum&#8217;s. A Sec. 34 court cannot. Under <a href=\"https:\/\/www.indiacode.nic.in\/handle\/123456789\/1978\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Sec. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996<\/a>, the only thing on offer is setting the award aside on one of a closed list of grounds. The court either leaves the award standing or it knocks it out. It does not &#8220;correct&#8221; your case to a better result, and (until very recently) it could not rewrite the award at all.<\/p>\n<p>Think of it this way. An appeal asks &#8220;was the tribunal right?&#8221; Sec. 34 asks a much narrower question: &#8220;did something go so wrong that this award cannot be allowed to stand?&#8221; Those are not the same question, and confusing them is the single most common reason challenges fail.<\/p>\n<h3>Where Sec. 34 sits: the recourse provision against a domestic award<\/h3>\n<p>Sec. 34 falls in Part I of the Act, which governs arbitrations seated in India. It is the recourse provision, the title of the section itself says so, against a domestic award and an India-seated international commercial arbitration award. A party does not &#8220;appeal&#8221; to a higher arbitral body; it applies to the court of competent jurisdiction, which exercises original jurisdiction over the set-aside application. That court is not sitting in appeal over the tribunal. It is hearing a fresh, statutorily bounded application to vacate the award. This is the court&#8217;s recourse role, distinct from the <a href=\"\/application-under-section-17-of-arbitration-act\">interim measures the tribunal itself can grant under Sec. 17<\/a> while the arbitration is still running.<\/p>\n<p>One distinction worth flagging early: a foreign-seated award is a different animal entirely. You do not challenge it under Sec. 34 at all. You resist its enforcement under Sec. 48 in Part II when the winning party tries to enforce it in India. We come back to that distinction later, because readers conflate the two constantly.<\/p>\n<h3>The guiding principle: minimal judicial interference<\/h3>\n<p>The whole architecture of Sec. 34 traces back to one idea, borrowed from Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on which the 1996 Act is built: courts should interfere with arbitral awards as little as possible. Party autonomy is the point of arbitration. If courts could re-open every award on the merits, arbitration would just be a slower, costlier first round before the real litigation. So the grounds are deliberately tight, the timeline is deliberately short, and the merits are deliberately off-limits.<\/p>\n<p>In practice, this principle does real work. When a Sec. 34 judge tells you the tribunal&#8217;s interpretation of a clause was &#8220;a possible view,&#8221; that is not laziness. That is the statute functioning as designed. The court is refusing to substitute its reading for the arbitrator&#8217;s, because that substitution is precisely what Sec. 34 forbids.<\/p>\n\n<h2 id=\"grounds-to-set-aside\">Grounds to set aside an arbitral award under Sec. 34<\/h2>\n<p>This is the part everyone wants, and the part everyone over-reads. The grounds to set aside an arbitral award under Sec. 34 are exhaustive. If your complaint about the award does not fit one of the statutory boxes below, it is not a Sec. 34 ground, no matter how unfair the result feels. So which boxes are there, and who has to prove what?<\/p>\n<p>The grounds split into two families. One family the challenging party must plead and prove. The other the court can find on its own, even if nobody raised it. There is also a third, separate ground that applies only to purely domestic awards. Getting this structure right is half the battle.<\/p>\n<h3>Party-proven grounds: Sec. 34(2)(a)<\/h3>\n<p>Under <a href=\"https:\/\/www.indiacode.nic.in\/handle\/123456789\/1978\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Sec. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996<\/a>, sub-clause (2)(a) lists five grounds the challenging party carries the burden of establishing, and they are all about the integrity of the process rather than the correctness of the outcome. A party can move to set aside where it proves: that a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity; that the arbitration agreement itself was not valid under the governing law; that it was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case; that the award deals with a dispute beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; or that the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the parties&#8217; agreement.<\/p>\n<p>Notice the common thread. Every one of these is a structural or procedural defect, not a substantive disagreement. &#8220;I wasn&#8217;t heard&#8221; is a ground. &#8220;I was heard and the arbitrator still got it wrong&#8221; is not. The <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/31621011\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49<\/a> decision laid out how these grounds, and the public-policy grounds below, fit together as a taxonomy, and it remains the standard reference point for how a Sec. 34 challenge is structured.<\/p>\n<p>The &#8220;beyond the scope&#8221; ground deserves a word of caution. If an award decides part of the dispute within the reference and part outside it, the court can sometimes sever the offending portion rather than strike the whole award, provided the two parts are genuinely separable. That severability idea becomes important later when we get to modification.<\/p>\n<h3>Court-determined grounds: Sec. 34(2)(b)<\/h3>\n<p>The second family lives in Sec. 34(2)(b), and here the court can act even without the party formally proving the point. There are two: that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under Indian law (non-arbitrability), and that the award conflicts with the public policy of India. Non-arbitrability covers categories that Indian law reserves for the courts or specialised tribunals, criminal matters, certain matrimonial and insolvency questions, and the like. Public policy is the bigger, messier ground, and it carries most of the litigation.<\/p>\n<h3>What &#8220;public policy of India&#8221; actually means<\/h3>\n<p>Public policy sounds like a blank cheque. It is not, at least not anymore. The phrase has a defined content built up through case law and then tightened by the 2015 amendment. As the Associate Builders framework set out, an award conflicts with the public policy of India where it runs counter to the fundamental policy of Indian law, where it conflicts with the most basic notions of justice or morality, or where it is induced by fraud or corruption. That last limb, the &#8220;shock the conscience&#8221; standard, is a high bar: the award has to be so unfair that no reasonable person would tolerate it.<\/p>\n<p>After the 2015 amendment and the <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/95111828\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Ssangyong Engineering &amp; Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131<\/a> ruling, the test got narrower still. The court made clear that &#8220;fundamental policy of Indian law&#8221; does not let a Sec. 34 court re-examine the merits through the back door. An error of law inside the award, or a debatable interpretation of a contract, does not breach public policy. The ground is reserved for awards that offend something foundational, not awards a judge simply disagrees with.<\/p>\n<h3>Patent illegality: Sec. 34(2A)<\/h3>\n<p>There is a separate ground that lives in its own sub-section and applies only to purely domestic awards: patent illegality under Sec. 34(2A). This matters, so read it carefully. Patent illegality is not available against an international commercial arbitration award, even one seated in India. It exists only for awards arising out of arbitrations between Indian parties.<\/p>\n<p>What is patent illegality? An illegality that goes to the root of the matter and appears on the face of the award: the tribunal ignored the substantive law of India, decided contrary to the terms of the contract, or reached a finding so perverse that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the evidence. The Ssangyong decision is the leading post-2015 statement of where this line sits. Crucially, a mere erroneous application of the law, or a possible-but-wrong reading of the evidence, is not patent illegality. The error has to be glaring and fundamental.<\/p>\n<h3>The merits bar: what is NOT a ground<\/h3>\n<p>Here is the wall that stops most challenges. A Sec. 34 court will not set aside an award because it is &#8220;wrong.&#8221; Re-appreciation of evidence is barred. A plausible-but-debatable interpretation of the contract is protected. If the tribunal took a view that a reasonable arbitrator could take, the court leaves it alone, even if the judge would have decided differently. The <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/80534060\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. DMRC, (2022) 1 SCC 131<\/a> decision put the restraint standard plainly: a court does not interfere merely because another view is possible; perversity or patent illegality must go to the root.<\/p>\n<p>So when a client says &#8220;my lawyer told me the award is wrong,&#8221; the honest answer is: being wrong is not enough. The award has to be wrong in a way the statute recognises, structurally defective, against public policy, or patently illegal at its root. The mistake practitioners see most often is a petition that argues the merits dressed up in the language of public policy. Courts see through it, and it fails.<\/p>\n<p>A common question practitioners raise is whether an arbitrator &#8220;ignoring evidence&#8221; is patent illegality or perversity. The honest answer is that it depends on degree. Ignoring a stray document is neither. Reaching a conclusion that no evidence on record could support, that is perversity, and it can cross into patent illegality for a domestic award. The pleading has to show the gap between the finding and the record, not just assert disagreement.<\/p>\n\n\n<figure class=\"ls-infographic-wrap\" style=\"margin:2rem 0;\">\n<div class=\"ls-ig-grounds\" style=\"margin:2rem 0;max-width:800px;\">\n<style>.ls-ig-grounds { font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, 'Segoe UI', Roboto, sans-serif; color: #212121; background: #ffffff; border: 1px solid #e0e0e0; border-radius: 10px; overflow: hidden; box-shadow: 0 2px 8px rgba(0,0,0,0.06); } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__title { background: #1a237e; color: #ffffff; padding: 18px 20px; font-size: 20px; font-weight: 700; line-height: 1.3; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__sub { padding: 12px 20px 4px; font-size: 14px; color: #555; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__root { margin: 8px 20px 4px; background: #ff6f00; color: #ffffff; text-align: center; font-weight: 700; font-size: 15px; padding: 12px; border-radius: 8px; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__connector { text-align: center; color: #1a237e; font-size: 22px; line-height: 1; margin: 2px 0; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__branches { display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(3, 1fr); gap: 14px; padding: 8px 20px 16px; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__branch { border: 2px solid #1a237e; border-radius: 8px; overflow: hidden; display: flex; flex-direction: column; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__bhead { background: #1a237e; color: #ffffff; padding: 10px 12px; font-weight: 700; font-size: 14px; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__btag { display: block; font-size: 12px; font-weight: 600; color: #ffd9b3; margin-top: 2px; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__blist { list-style: none; margin: 0; padding: 10px 12px; font-size: 14px; line-height: 1.45; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__blist li { padding: 5px 0 5px 18px; position: relative; border-bottom: 1px solid #f0f0f0; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__blist li:last-child { border-bottom: none; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__blist li::before { content: \"\\25B8\"; color: #ff6f00; position: absolute; left: 0; top: 5px; font-size: 13px; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__note { background: #fff3e0; border-left: 4px solid #ff6f00; margin: 0 20px 16px; padding: 10px 14px; font-size: 13px; line-height: 1.5; color: #5d4037; border-radius: 0 6px 6px 0; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__foot { display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center; padding: 12px 20px; border-top: 1px solid #eee; font-size: 12px; color: #777; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__brand { font-weight: 700; color: #1a237e; font-size: 14px; } @media (max-width: 600px) { .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__branches { grid-template-columns: 1fr; } .ls-ig-grounds .ls-ig__title { font-size: 18px; } }<\/style>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__title\">Grounds to Set Aside an Award Under Sec. 34<\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__sub\">The grounds are exhaustive. They fall into three branches, and who must prove what differs in each.<\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__root\">Is your complaint one of these statutory grounds?<\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__connector\">&#9660;<\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__branches\">\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__branch\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__bhead\">Party-proven<span class=\"ls-ig__btag\">Sec. 34(2)(a)<\/span><\/div>\n      <ul class=\"ls-ig__blist\">\n        <li>Party under incapacity<\/li>\n        <li>Invalid arbitration agreement<\/li>\n        <li>No proper notice, unable to present case<\/li>\n        <li>Award beyond scope of reference<\/li>\n        <li>Improper tribunal composition or procedure<\/li>\n      <\/ul>\n    <\/div>\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__branch\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__bhead\">Court-determined<span class=\"ls-ig__btag\">Sec. 34(2)(b)<\/span><\/div>\n      <ul class=\"ls-ig__blist\">\n        <li>Subject matter not arbitrable under Indian law<\/li>\n        <li>Award conflicts with the public policy of India<\/li>\n      <\/ul>\n    <\/div>\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__branch\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__bhead\">Patent illegality<span class=\"ls-ig__btag\">Sec. 34(2A)<\/span><\/div>\n      <ul class=\"ls-ig__blist\">\n        <li>Illegality going to the root, on the face of the award<\/li>\n        <li>Domestic awards only, not international commercial arbitration<\/li>\n      <\/ul>\n    <\/div>\n  <\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__note\">No match? Then it is not a Sec. 34 ground. A &#8220;wrong&#8221; award, re-appreciation of evidence, or a plausible-but-debatable view is barred. The court does not re-decide the dispute on its merits.<\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__foot\">\n    <span>Source: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Sec. 34<\/span>\n    <span class=\"ls-ig__brand\">LawSikho<\/span>\n  <\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/figure>\n\n<h2 id=\"how-courts-narrowed-grounds\">How Indian courts narrowed the grounds: from Saw Pipes to Ssangyong<\/h2>\n<p>Why does any of this history matter to someone filing a petition next month? Because the grounds you can actually run today are the product of a twenty-year tug-of-war, and citing the wrong era&#8217;s standard is a fast way to look unprepared in front of a commercial court judge. The line between &#8220;wrong&#8221; and &#8220;set-aside-able&#8221; has moved, and it has moved toward restraint.<\/p>\n<h3>The pro-intervention era (2003 to 2014)<\/h3>\n<p>For about a decade, the courts read the grounds expansively. The <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/919241\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705<\/a> decision in 2003 read &#8220;patent illegality&#8221; into the public-policy ground, which opened the door to courts reviewing awards for legal errors. A later line of authority broadened &#8220;fundamental policy of Indian law&#8221; further still, letting courts probe the reasoning of awards in a way that came close to a merits review. The practical effect: more awards were vulnerable, and arbitration started to look less final than its users had bargained for. That was the high-water mark of judicial intervention.<\/p>\n<h3>The 2015 course-correction<\/h3>\n<p>Parliament pushed back. The 2015 amendment to the Act did three things that matter here. It added Sec. 34(2A), carving patent illegality out as a separate, narrowed ground for domestic awards only, rather than letting it ride inside public policy for every award. It restricted &#8220;public policy&#8221; so that a contravention of Indian law, or an erroneous application of the law, would no longer by itself justify setting aside. And it expressly barred re-appreciation of evidence as a route to interference. The pendulum swung back toward minimal interference, where the 1996 Act had always intended it to sit.<\/p>\n<h3>Where the line sits today<\/h3>\n<p>Post-2015, the controlling standard is restraint. The <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/80534060\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. DMRC, (2022) 1 SCC 131<\/a> decision crystallised it: courts must not interfere merely because another view is possible, and perversity must go to the root of the matter before an award falls. What experienced practitioners know is that this is not just doctrine, it is how the judge in front of you will actually approach the file. A petition that respects the restraint standard, and shows a defect going to the root rather than a quarrel with the outcome, is a petition that gets taken seriously. One that re-argues the case loses fast.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"limitation-period\">The limitation period: 3 months, 30 days, &#8220;but not thereafter&#8221;<\/h2>\n<p>If the grounds are where challenges fail on substance, limitation is where they die on a technicality, often before anyone reads the merits. Sec. 34 carries one of the strictest limitation regimes in Indian procedure, and the strictness is not an accident. The Act treats finality as a feature. So how long do you actually have, and what happens at the wall?<\/p>\n<h3>The base rule: three months from receipt<\/h3>\n<p>Under <a href=\"https:\/\/www.indiacode.nic.in\/handle\/123456789\/1978\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Sec. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996<\/a>, sub-section (3) gives you three months to file your set-aside application. The clock does not start on the date the award was made. It starts on the date the party making the application received a signed copy of the award. That distinction matters enormously in practice. An award may be dated weeks before it actually reaches the parties; the three months runs from receipt, not from the date printed on the award.<\/p>\n<h3>The 30-day condonable window, and what &#8220;but not thereafter&#8221; forecloses<\/h3>\n<p>After the three months, Sec. 34(3) allows a further period of thirty days, and no more, if the court is satisfied the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing in time. Then come the four words that have ended more challenges than any ground in the Act: &#8220;but not thereafter.&#8221; Once that 30-day window closes, the door shuts completely. The general extension machinery of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to rescue a late Sec. 34 filing. There is no further condonation, however good your reason.<\/p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/65585365\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">My Preferred Transformation &amp; Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., 2025 INSC 56<\/a> decision drove this home in early 2025. The court held that &#8220;but not thereafter&#8221; means exactly what it says: the outer limit is hard, and the benefit of provisions that exclude certain periods or extend deadlines under the Limitation Act does not stretch the Sec. 34 clock past the 30-day cap.<\/p>\n<h3>The court-vacation trap<\/h3>\n<p>Here is the trap that catches careful lawyers, not just careless ones. What if your 30-day window expires while the court is closed for its summer or winter vacation? Surely you can file on the first reopening day? The My Preferred Transformation decision said no. Vacation does not save a filing that fell due during the break. The court even flagged the rigidity of this outcome as something Parliament might want to revisit, but until it does, the rule stands and it is unforgiving.<\/p>\n<p>The second-order lesson is about docket discipline. Because the clock runs from the date of receipt and the outer wall is absolute, experienced counsel diarise the deadline the moment the signed award lands, working backward from the date of receipt, and they treat the 30-day extension as already spent. A common question filers raise is whether they can rely on getting the extension; the safer assumption is that you will not get it, so plan to file well inside the three months.<\/p>\n<h3>When does time start: receipt versus a Sec. 33 correction request<\/h3>\n<p>One more wrinkle on the start date. If a party has asked the tribunal to correct or interpret the award under Sec. 33, the limitation for a Sec. 34 challenge runs from the date the party receives the tribunal&#8217;s disposal of that request, not from the original award. So a pending Sec. 33 application can shift the start of your three months. But do not treat Sec. 33 as a stalling device: file it only for a genuine correction, because a frivolous one will not buy you time and may simply waste it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"ls-infographic-wrap\" style=\"margin:2rem 0;\">\n<div class=\"ls-ig-limit\" style=\"margin:2rem 0;max-width:800px;\">\n<style>.ls-ig-limit { font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, 'Segoe UI', Roboto, sans-serif; color: #212121; background: #ffffff; border: 1px solid #e0e0e0; border-radius: 10px; overflow: hidden; box-shadow: 0 2px 8px rgba(0,0,0,0.06); } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__title { background: #1a237e; color: #ffffff; padding: 18px 20px; font-size: 20px; font-weight: 700; line-height: 1.3; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__sub { padding: 12px 20px 6px; font-size: 14px; color: #555; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__track { padding: 8px 20px 4px; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__step { display: flex; align-items: stretch; gap: 14px; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__rail { display: flex; flex-direction: column; align-items: center; width: 24px; flex-shrink: 0; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__dot { width: 18px; height: 18px; border-radius: 50%; background: #ff6f00; border: 3px solid #fff; box-shadow: 0 0 0 2px #ff6f00; margin-top: 6px; flex-shrink: 0; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__dot--wall { background: #b71c1c; box-shadow: 0 0 0 2px #b71c1c; border-radius: 3px; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__line { flex: 1; width: 3px; background: #1a237e; margin: 2px 0; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__card { flex: 1; padding: 4px 0 18px; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__phase { font-size: 12px; font-weight: 700; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: 0.4px; color: #ff6f00; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__head { font-size: 16px; font-weight: 700; color: #1a237e; margin: 2px 0 4px; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__desc { font-size: 14px; line-height: 1.5; color: #333; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__card--wall .ls-ig__phase, .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__card--wall .ls-ig__head { color: #b71c1c; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__card--wall { background: #fdecea; border-radius: 8px; padding: 10px 14px; margin-bottom: 6px; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__note { background: #fff3e0; border-left: 4px solid #ff6f00; margin: 4px 20px 16px; padding: 10px 14px; font-size: 13px; line-height: 1.5; color: #5d4037; border-radius: 0 6px 6px 0; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__foot { display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center; padding: 12px 20px; border-top: 1px solid #eee; font-size: 12px; color: #777; } .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__brand { font-weight: 700; color: #1a237e; font-size: 14px; } @media (max-width: 600px) { .ls-ig-limit .ls-ig__title { font-size: 18px; } }<\/style>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__title\">Sec. 34 Limitation: 3 Months + 30 Days<\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__sub\">The clock runs from the date you receive a signed copy of the award, not the date printed on it.<\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__track\">\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__step\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__rail\"><span class=\"ls-ig__dot\"><\/span><span class=\"ls-ig__line\"><\/span><\/div>\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__card\">\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__phase\">Start<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__head\">Date of receipt of the award<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__desc\">Time runs from the day the party receives a signed copy, not the award date. A pending Sec. 33 correction request shifts the start to the date that request is disposed of.<\/div>\n      <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__step\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__rail\"><span class=\"ls-ig__dot\"><\/span><span class=\"ls-ig__line\"><\/span><\/div>\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__card\">\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__phase\">Base window<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__head\">3 months to file<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__desc\">Sec. 34(3) gives three months as of right. Build your petition to land comfortably inside this window.<\/div>\n      <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__step\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__rail\"><span class=\"ls-ig__dot\"><\/span><span class=\"ls-ig__line\"><\/span><\/div>\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__card\">\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__phase\">Condonable<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__head\">+ 30 days, sufficient cause only<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__desc\">A further 30 days, and no more, if the court is satisfied you were prevented by sufficient cause. Treat it as already spent.<\/div>\n      <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__step\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__rail\"><span class=\"ls-ig__dot ls-ig__dot--wall\"><\/span><\/div>\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__card ls-ig__card--wall\">\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__phase\">Hard wall<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__head\">&#8220;But not thereafter&#8221;<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__desc\">After the 30 days, the door shuts completely. The Limitation Act, 1963 machinery does not rescue a late filing.<\/div>\n      <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n  <\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__note\">Court vacation does not extend the clock. A deadline that falls due during a court holiday is not saved by filing on the reopening day.<\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__foot\">\n    <span>Source: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Sec. 34(3)<\/span>\n    <span class=\"ls-ig__brand\">LawSikho<\/span>\n  <\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/figure>\n\n<h2 id=\"can-court-modify-award\">Can a court modify an arbitral award? Gayatri Balasamy (2025) explained<\/h2>\n<p>For years this question had a clean, settled answer, and then in 2025 a Constitution Bench changed it. If you only read one section of this guide for what is genuinely new, read this one, because the freshest, most-searched question in Sec. 34 practice right now is whether a court can rewrite an award instead of just killing it. The answer used to be a flat no. It is now a qualified yes.<\/p>\n<h3>The old rule: set aside or uphold, never modify<\/h3>\n<p>The baseline was the &#8220;Lakshman rekha.&#8221; A Sec. 34 court could do one of two things and no third: leave the award standing, or set it aside in whole or in relevant part. It could not modify the award, could not substitute its own figure, could not adjust the interest, could not rewrite a clause of the decision. The <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/98965625\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem, (2021) 9 SCC 1<\/a> ruling in 2021 stated this in the clearest terms: the power to set aside does not include a power to modify, and reading one into the other would cross a line the statute does not authorise.<\/p>\n<h3>The 2025 Constitution Bench shift<\/h3>\n<p>That line moved on 30 April 2025. In a 4:1 decision, a five-judge Constitution Bench in <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/111751006\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2025 INSC 605<\/a> held that courts do have a limited power to modify an arbitral award. Limited is the operative word. The majority confined the power to specific situations: severing and setting aside the invalid portion of an award where it is separable from the valid part; correcting clerical, computational, or typographical errors that appear on the face of the award; modifying post-award interest in appropriate cases; and, for the Supreme Court, exercising its power under Article 142 of the Constitution sparingly to do complete justice. This was not a licence to re-write awards on the merits. It was a narrow, defined set of corrective powers.<\/p>\n<h3>Partial set-aside<\/h3>\n<p>One strand of the decision settles a long-running practical question: can a court strike down only the offending part of an award and let the rest stand? Yes, where the bad part is genuinely severable from the good. If a tribunal decided two distinct claims and got one badly wrong while the other is sound, the court need not sink the whole award. It can excise the defective portion. This is why severability, drafted into the award and pleaded in the petition, has become such a valuable feature.<\/p>\n<h3>Sec. 34(4): remission to the tribunal<\/h3>\n<p>Separate from modification, the Act has always had a quieter tool in Sec. 34(4). On a party&#8217;s request, the court can adjourn the set-aside proceedings and send the matter back to the tribunal, giving it an opportunity to resume the arbitration or take steps that, in the tribunal&#8217;s opinion, will eliminate the grounds for setting aside. Remission is not the court fixing the award; it is the court handing the award back to its author to cure a curable defect. It is underused, and in the right case it is faster and cleaner than a full set-aside.<\/p>\n<h3>Why the dissent matters<\/h3>\n<p>The decision was 4:1, and the dissent is not a footnote. The dissenting view warned that letting courts modify awards reopens the finality that arbitration is supposed to deliver, and risks turning Sec. 34 into a quasi-appeal by another name. That warning has a real second-order consequence: losing parties now have a fresh incentive to litigate post-award, hoping for a modification rather than a clean win or loss. Expect more Sec. 34 work, not less, and expect a premium on awards drafted to be severable so a court can trim the bad part without endangering the whole.<\/p>\n<p>A common question after Gayatri Balasamy is the practical difference between setting aside and modifying. Setting aside vacates the award (or a severable part of it) and usually sends the parties back toward fresh arbitration on that issue. Modifying lets the award stand but adjusts a defined, narrow aspect of it, a computational error or post-award interest, without a fresh round. For a party with a sound award marred by one arithmetic slip, that distinction is the difference between years of re-litigation and a one-line correction.<\/p>\n\n\n<h2 id=\"stay-of-enforcement\">Does filing a Sec. 34 petition stop enforcement? The automatic-stay myth<\/h2>\n<p>This is the single most expensive misunderstanding in Sec. 34 practice, and it costs award-debtors real money every year. The belief is intuitive and completely wrong. So does filing a Sec. 34 petition freeze the award? No. It does not.<\/p>\n<h3>The myth<\/h3>\n<p>Many parties assume that the moment they file a set-aside application, the award is suspended and the winning side cannot touch it. That used to be closer to true, when filing carried an automatic stay. The 2015 amendment to Sec. 36, reinforced by later changes, ended that. Filing a Sec. 34 petition, by itself, does nothing to stop enforcement.<\/p>\n<h3>The real mechanism<\/h3>\n<p>Under the amended scheme, an arbitral award is enforceable as if it were a decree of the court once the limitation period to challenge it expires or, if a challenge is filed, the award does not automatically stop being enforceable. To actually halt enforcement, the award-debtor must file a separate application under Sec. 36(2) seeking a stay, and the court must grant it. Two distinct steps: the Sec. 34 challenge, and the Sec. 36(2) stay application. Skip the second and you may find the award being executed against you while your challenge crawls through the docket. If you need to halt enforcement, you file the stay application alongside the challenge, not instead of it. This is also where a reader looking to freeze action may want to understand <a href=\"\/how-to-enforce-domestic-arbitral-awards-in-india\">the enforcement of a domestic award under Sec. 36<\/a>, since the challenge and enforcement tracks run in parallel. In some situations a party may also need <a href=\"\/draft-a-section-9-petition-under-arbitration-act\">interim protection through a Sec. 9 petition before the court<\/a> to preserve the position while the challenge is pending.<\/p>\n<h3>Conditions on a stay<\/h3>\n<p>Even when the court grants a stay, it rarely grants it for free. For a money award, the court will typically condition the stay on the award-debtor depositing the awarded amount, or a substantial part of it, into court, or furnishing a bank guarantee. The logic is to protect the award-holder from a debtor who challenges merely to delay. There is a narrow exception: where the award is prima facie shown to be tainted by fraud or corruption, the court can grant an unconditional stay. But that is the exception, not the norm, and a party who assumes it applies to an ordinary commercial award is in for an unpleasant surprise.<\/p>\n<p>What experienced practitioners know is that the deposit condition is where strategy lives. A debtor with a genuine challenge but no liquidity has to plan for the deposit, or negotiate a bank guarantee, well before the stay hearing. A common question is exactly how much you have to put up; there is no fixed percentage, the court tailors the condition to the case, but assuming you will pay something substantial is the only safe starting point.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"how-to-file-section-34-petition\">How to file a Sec. 34 petition: step-by-step<\/h2>\n<p>Enough doctrine. If you have decided you have a real ground and you are inside the clock, here is the actual workflow for getting a Sec. 34 petition on file and surviving the first hearing. Follow these seven steps in order, because several of them are sequential and skipping one can be fatal.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><strong>Compute the limitation window.<\/strong> Count three months from the date you received the signed copy of the award, not the award date. Diarise the deadline immediately, and treat the additional 30-day condonable period as already gone. Aim to file inside the three months.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Identify the correct forum.<\/strong> File before the court of competent jurisdiction. For a specified-value commercial dispute, that is the Commercial Court or the Commercial Division of the High Court; for other disputes, the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the district. Pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction both matter, so confirm both before filing.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Serve prior notice under Sec. 34(5).<\/strong> Issue prior notice of the application to the other party, and file an affidavit endorsing compliance with this requirement along with the petition. This step is easy to overlook and a recurring reason petitions get held up at filing.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Draft the petition and plead the grounds with specificity.<\/strong> Tie each ground to a precise statutory sub-clause: 34(2)(a), 34(2)(b), or 34(2A). Do not plead &#8220;the award is wrong.&#8221; Plead the structural, public-policy, or patent-illegality defect and show how it goes to the root. Annex the award copy and the relevant arbitration record.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Pay the court fee and ensure the award is adequately stamped.<\/strong> Pay the prescribed court fee, and make sure the arbitral award carries the correct stamp duty. An inadequately stamped award is a classic day-one defect, and stamp duty on an award can have ad valorem implications depending on the State and the amount.<\/li>\n<li><strong>File, and separately move a Sec. 36(2) stay application if you need to halt enforcement.<\/strong> Remember the automatic-stay myth: the challenge alone does not stop execution. If you need enforcement frozen, file the Sec. 36(2) application at the same time.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Appear, and argue on the record.<\/strong> The court decides the challenge on the existing arbitration record. There is no fresh evidence and no merits re-trial. Be ready to argue your pleaded grounds against the record, not to re-run the dispute.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h3>Which court: forum and pecuniary jurisdiction<\/h3>\n<p>Forum selection trips up more first-time filers than any other procedural step. The governing question is the value and nature of the dispute. A specified-value commercial dispute goes to the Commercial Court or, where the High Court has original jurisdiction, its Commercial Division. A non-commercial or below-threshold dispute goes to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the district, which means a District Judge, not a Munsiff or junior civil court. File in the wrong forum and you lose time you cannot get back, and time is the one thing Sec. 34 does not give you.<\/p>\n<h3>Documents and the petition skeleton<\/h3>\n<p>Build your filing bundle as a checklist so nothing is missing at the counter. A complete Sec. 34 filing typically includes: a certified or signed copy of the arbitral award; a copy of the arbitration agreement; the relevant portions of the arbitral record relied on; the Sec. 34(5) prior-notice document and the accompanying affidavit of compliance; a vakalatnama; proof of court-fee payment; and the duly stamped award. Missing any one of these can mean the petition is returned for curing of defects, and a defect cured outside the limitation window can be a defect that sinks the case.<\/p>\n<h3>Costs and stamp duty<\/h3>\n<p>On cost, three heads matter: the court fee, the stamp duty on the award, and professional fees. The court fee is prescribed by the relevant State or High Court schedule. Stamp duty on the award varies by State and can be ad valorem, scaling with the award amount, so confirm the applicable rate before you assume a number. Professional fees vary widely with the complexity of the award and the seniority of counsel, and we won&#8217;t quote a figure here because any single number would mislead. The point to internalise is that an unstamped or under-stamped award is not a minor formality; it is a substantive defect that the other side will raise immediately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"ls-infographic-wrap\" style=\"margin:2rem 0;\">\n<div class=\"ls-ig-file\" style=\"margin:2rem 0;max-width:800px;\">\n<style>.ls-ig-file { font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, 'Segoe UI', Roboto, sans-serif; color: #212121; background: #ffffff; border: 1px solid #e0e0e0; border-radius: 10px; overflow: hidden; box-shadow: 0 2px 8px rgba(0,0,0,0.06); } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__title { background: #1a237e; color: #ffffff; padding: 18px 20px; font-size: 20px; font-weight: 700; line-height: 1.3; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__sub { padding: 12px 20px 6px; font-size: 14px; color: #555; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__track { padding: 8px 20px 4px; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__step { display: flex; align-items: stretch; gap: 14px; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__rail { display: flex; flex-direction: column; align-items: center; width: 30px; flex-shrink: 0; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__num { width: 28px; height: 28px; border-radius: 50%; background: #ff6f00; color: #ffffff; font-weight: 700; font-size: 15px; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; margin-top: 4px; flex-shrink: 0; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__line { flex: 1; width: 3px; background: #1a237e; margin: 2px 0; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__card { flex: 1; padding: 4px 0 18px; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__head { font-size: 16px; font-weight: 700; color: #1a237e; margin: 4px 0 4px; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__desc { font-size: 14px; line-height: 1.5; color: #333; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__note { background: #fff3e0; border-left: 4px solid #ff6f00; margin: 4px 20px 16px; padding: 10px 14px; font-size: 13px; line-height: 1.5; color: #5d4037; border-radius: 0 6px 6px 0; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__foot { display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center; padding: 12px 20px; border-top: 1px solid #eee; font-size: 12px; color: #777; } .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__brand { font-weight: 700; color: #1a237e; font-size: 14px; } @media (max-width: 600px) { .ls-ig-file .ls-ig__title { font-size: 18px; } }<\/style>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__title\">How to File a Sec. 34 Petition: 7 Steps<\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__sub\">Work the sequence in order. A slip on limitation or forum at the start can sink the whole challenge.<\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__track\">\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__step\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__rail\"><span class=\"ls-ig__num\">1<\/span><span class=\"ls-ig__line\"><\/span><\/div>\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__card\">\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__head\">Compute the limitation period<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__desc\">Count 3 months from the date you received the signed award. Diarise the +30 day outer limit as already spent, because nothing runs past it.<\/div>\n      <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__step\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__rail\"><span class=\"ls-ig__num\">2<\/span><span class=\"ls-ig__line\"><\/span><\/div>\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__card\">\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__head\">Identify the correct forum<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__desc\">File before the Commercial Court where the subject matter is a commercial dispute, otherwise the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. The wrong forum wastes limitation.<\/div>\n      <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__step\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__rail\"><span class=\"ls-ig__num\">3<\/span><span class=\"ls-ig__line\"><\/span><\/div>\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__card\">\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__head\">Serve the Sec. 34(5) notice and file the affidavit<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__desc\">Give prior written notice to the other party, then file an affidavit endorsing that notice has been issued. This is a precondition to a valid filing.<\/div>\n      <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__step\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__rail\"><span class=\"ls-ig__num\">4<\/span><span class=\"ls-ig__line\"><\/span><\/div>\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__card\">\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__head\">Draft and plead grounds against the right sub-clause<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__desc\">Map each complaint to a specific ground in Sec. 34(2), Sec. 34(2)(b) or Sec. 34(2A). A vague &#8220;wrong award&#8221; plea is not a ground.<\/div>\n      <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__step\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__rail\"><span class=\"ls-ig__num\">5<\/span><span class=\"ls-ig__line\"><\/span><\/div>\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__card\">\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__head\">Pay court fee and stamp duty on the award<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__desc\">Calculate the ad valorem court fee and the stamp duty payable on the award as per the State schedule. An under-stamped award can stall the petition.<\/div>\n      <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__step\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__rail\"><span class=\"ls-ig__num\">6<\/span><span class=\"ls-ig__line\"><\/span><\/div>\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__card\">\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__head\">File, then move a separate Sec. 36(2) stay application<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__desc\">Filing the petition does not freeze enforcement. Move a distinct application to stay the award, which the court may grant on terms including a deposit.<\/div>\n      <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n    <div class=\"ls-ig__step\">\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__rail\"><span class=\"ls-ig__num\">7<\/span><\/div>\n      <div class=\"ls-ig__card\">\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__head\">Argue the hearing on the record<\/div>\n        <div class=\"ls-ig__desc\">The court reviews on the existing arbitral record. No fresh evidence and no re-appreciation of merits, so the petition must stand on the file as it is.<\/div>\n      <\/div>\n    <\/div>\n  <\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__note\">Steps 1 and 2 are unforgiving. Get limitation or forum wrong and the strongest grounds never get heard.<\/div>\n  <div class=\"ls-ig__foot\">\n    <span>Source: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Sec. 34<\/span>\n    <span class=\"ls-ig__brand\">LawSikho<\/span>\n  <\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/figure>\n\n<h2 id=\"section-34-vs-37-vs-36\">Sec. 34 vs Sec. 37 vs Sec. 36: challenge, appeal, enforcement<\/h2>\n<p>Readers conflate these three sections constantly, and the confusion has real consequences: a party who thinks Sec. 34 is an appeal pleads it like one and loses. So what is the clean division of labour between challenging, appealing, and enforcing an award?<\/p>\n<h3>The comparison table<\/h3>\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Provision<\/th>\n<th>Nature<\/th>\n<th>What it does<\/th>\n<th>Who files and when<\/th>\n<th>Appeal route<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Sec. 34<\/td>\n<td>Original challenge<\/td>\n<td>Application to set aside a domestic award on limited grounds<\/td>\n<td>The award-debtor, within 3 months (plus up to 30 days) of receiving the award<\/td>\n<td>Appeal lies under Sec. 37<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Sec. 37<\/td>\n<td>Appeal<\/td>\n<td>Appeal from the order setting aside or refusing to set aside under Sec. 34<\/td>\n<td>The party aggrieved by the Sec. 34 order, within the prescribed appeal period<\/td>\n<td>No second appeal; Article 136 SLP to the Supreme Court lies<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Sec. 36<\/td>\n<td>Enforcement<\/td>\n<td>Enforces the award as a decree once it is no longer open to challenge or stay<\/td>\n<td>The award-holder, after limitation expires or stay is refused<\/td>\n<td>Stay is sought under Sec. 36(2), not an appeal of the award itself<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<h3>The appeal route: Sec. 37<\/h3>\n<p>If you lose your Sec. 34 challenge, you are not finished. Sec. 37 provides an appeal from an order that sets aside, or refuses to set aside, an award under Sec. 34. The appeal is to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from the court that passed the Sec. 34 order. One firm limit: there is no second appeal from a Sec. 37 order. The only further route is a special leave petition to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, which the Court grants sparingly. So Sec. 37 is usually the last real merits-stage opportunity.<\/p>\n<h3>Foreign awards are different: Sec. 48<\/h3>\n<p>Here is the distinction readers miss most. Everything above concerns domestic awards under Part I. A foreign-seated award is governed by Part II, and you do not challenge it under Sec. 34 at all. When the holder of a foreign award seeks to enforce it in India, the resisting party objects at the enforcement stage under Sec. 48, on grounds that broadly track the New York Convention. Trying to set aside a foreign award under Sec. 34 is a category error, and it is one of the more common ones. If your award is foreign-seated, your battleground is Sec. 48 enforcement, not a Sec. 34 challenge.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"common-mistakes\">Common mistakes when challenging an arbitral award<\/h2>\n<p>Most Sec. 34 challenges do not fail because the law was against them. They fail because of avoidable errors that have nothing to do with the strength of the underlying complaint. Which mistakes recur, and how do you stay out of them?<\/p>\n<h3>Missing the limitation window<\/h3>\n<p>The vacation trap deserves repeating because it keeps catching people. The 30-day extension is condonable only for sufficient cause, the outer wall is absolute, and a court holiday does not save a deadline that fell during the break. The fix is the docketing discipline covered earlier: count from receipt, file inside three months, assume the extension is gone.<\/p>\n<h3>Assuming filing stays the award<\/h3>\n<p>The automatic-stay myth is the second recurring killer. Filing a Sec. 34 petition does not freeze enforcement. If you do not separately move a Sec. 36(2) stay, and prepare for the deposit or bank-guarantee condition that usually comes with it, you can find the award being executed against you while you wait for your challenge to be heard.<\/p>\n<h3>Pleading &#8220;the award is wrong&#8221;<\/h3>\n<p>The merits bar sinks more petitions than any single ground. A petition that argues the tribunal got the facts or the contract wrong, without anchoring the complaint to a statutory ground, is dead on arrival. This is where most applicants go wrong: dress up a merits disagreement as a public-policy violation and the court will see straight through it. Plead the structural defect, the public-policy breach, or the patent illegality, and show it going to the root.<\/p>\n<h3>Procedural defects: stamping, forum, and the Sec. 34(5) notice<\/h3>\n<p>The unglamorous trio: an inadequately stamped award, filing in the wrong forum, and a skipped Sec. 34(5) prior notice. Each is entirely avoidable and each can stall or sink a petition before the grounds are argued. A common question is whether these can be fixed after filing; sometimes yes, but a defect cured outside the limitation window may be a defect that comes too late. Build the filing bundle as a checklist and cure problems before the clock runs out, not after.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"whats-changing-2024-bill\">What&#8217;s changing: the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2024<\/h2>\n<p>If you are planning a Sec. 34 strategy that has to hold up over the next few years, you should know what may be coming, while being clear that none of it is law yet. Could the rules you have just read change? Possibly, and the proposed direction is worth tracking.<\/p>\n<h3>Status: proposed, not enacted<\/h3>\n<p>The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2024 is a consultation draft. It was released on 18 October 2024 by the Department of Legal Affairs, drawing on an expert committee report, and it has not been enacted. Treat everything in it as a signal of where reform may go, not as the current law. Nothing in this section overrides anything above.<\/p>\n<h3>What it proposes<\/h3>\n<p>The draft floats several changes that touch Sec. 34 directly. It proposes codifying a partial set-aside power, putting on a statutory footing what the 2025 case law now recognises. It proposes appellate arbitral tribunals, institutional bodies that would hear challenges instead of, or before, the seat courts. It proposes extending patent illegality to international commercial arbitration, deleting the current carve-out that limits Sec. 34(2A) to domestic awards. It floats a requirement that courts formulate the grounds of challenge with precision, and tighter timelines across the process.<\/p>\n<h3>Why it matters<\/h3>\n<p>If enacted in something like its current form, the Bill would partly settle by statute the very debates this guide describes, the modification and partial-set-aside questions that the courts have been working out case by case. The likely second-order effect is a push toward institutional arbitration and pressure to compress the three-to-four-year disposal times that Sec. 34 challenges can currently take. Early signals suggest reform is on the agenda; practitioners expect movement, but the prudent course is to plan around the law as it stands today and watch the Bill rather than bank on it.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"faq\">Frequently asked questions<\/h2>\n<p><strong>1. What is Sec. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act?<\/strong>\nSec. 34 is the provision that lets a party apply to a court to set aside a domestic arbitral award on a closed list of grounds. It is a recourse remedy, not an appeal: the court can vacate the award but cannot re-decide the dispute on its merits. It sits in Part I of the 1996 Act and applies to India-seated arbitrations.<\/p>\n<p><strong>2. What are the grounds to set aside an arbitral award under Sec. 34?<\/strong>\nThe grounds fall into three groups: party-proven defects under Sec. 34(2)(a) (incapacity, invalid agreement, lack of proper notice or inability to present the case, award beyond scope, improper tribunal composition or procedure); court-determined grounds under Sec. 34(2)(b) (non-arbitrability and conflict with the public policy of India); and patent illegality under Sec. 34(2A) for purely domestic awards. The list is exhaustive.<\/p>\n<p><strong>3. What is &#8220;patent illegality&#8221; under Sec. 34(2A)?<\/strong>\nPatent illegality is an illegality that goes to the root of the matter and appears on the face of the award, for example the tribunal ignoring the substantive law of India, deciding against the contract&#8217;s terms, or reaching a perverse finding no reasonable person could reach. It is a separate ground that applies only to purely domestic awards. A mere erroneous application of law is not enough.<\/p>\n<p><strong>4. Can an arbitral award be challenged because it is wrong on the merits?<\/strong>\nNo. A Sec. 34 court does not re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own view, and a plausible-but-debatable reading by the tribunal is protected. Being &#8220;wrong&#8221; is not a ground; the award has to be structurally defective, against public policy, or patently illegal at its root. This is the bar that defeats most challenges.<\/p>\n<p><strong>5. What is the time limit to file a Sec. 34 application?<\/strong>\nThree months from the date the challenging party received a signed copy of the award. The clock runs from receipt, not from the date printed on the award, which can be a meaningful difference in practice.<\/p>\n<p><strong>6. Can the 3-month limitation under Sec. 34 be extended?<\/strong>\nOnly by up to 30 further days, and only if the court is satisfied there was sufficient cause for the delay. After that, &#8220;but not thereafter&#8221; forecloses any further extension; the general Limitation Act machinery does not rescue a late Sec. 34 filing.<\/p>\n<p><strong>7. Does patent illegality apply to international commercial arbitration?<\/strong>\nNo. Patent illegality under Sec. 34(2A) is available only against purely domestic awards. It cannot be used to challenge an international commercial arbitration award, even one seated in India. For such awards, public policy remains the relevant ground.<\/p>\n<p><strong>8. What counts as &#8220;public policy of India&#8221; for setting aside an award?<\/strong>\nAn award conflicts with the public policy of India where it contravenes the fundamental policy of Indian law, conflicts with the most basic notions of justice or morality (the &#8220;shock the conscience&#8221; standard), or is induced by fraud or corruption. After the 2015 amendment, this ground was narrowed so that an error of law inside the award does not by itself breach public policy.<\/p>\n<p><strong>9. Which court do I file a Sec. 34 petition in?<\/strong>\nFor a specified-value commercial dispute, the Commercial Court or the Commercial Division of the High Court with original jurisdiction; otherwise, the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the district. Both pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction matter, so confirm the correct forum before filing.<\/p>\n<p><strong>10. What is the court fee and stamp duty for a Sec. 34 application?<\/strong>\nThe court fee follows the applicable State or High Court schedule, and stamp duty on the arbitral award varies by State and can be ad valorem, scaling with the award amount. There is no single national figure, so confirm both the court fee and the stamp rate for your State. An inadequately stamped award is a serious, easily-raised defect.<\/p>\n<p><strong>11. Do I need to serve notice before filing under Sec. 34(5)?<\/strong>\nYes. Sec. 34(5) requires prior notice of the application to the other party, accompanied by an affidavit endorsing compliance filed with the petition. It is a step that is easy to miss and a recurring reason petitions get held up at the filing stage.<\/p>\n<p><strong>12. How long does a Sec. 34 case take to be decided?<\/strong>\nThere is no fixed answer, and timelines vary by court, docket load, and complexity, but disposal can run into years rather than months in busy jurisdictions. Reducing these timelines is one of the stated aims behind proposed reforms, though those proposals are not yet law.<\/p>\n<p><strong>13. Can a court modify an arbitral award under Sec. 34?<\/strong>\nUntil 2025 the answer was a flat no: a court could set aside or uphold, never modify. After the 2025 Constitution Bench decision, courts now have a limited power to modify, confined to severing the invalid part, correcting clerical or computational errors, adjusting post-award interest, and the Supreme Court&#8217;s sparing use of Article 142. It is not a power to re-decide the award.<\/p>\n<p><strong>14. What did Gayatri Balasamy (2025) decide about modifying awards?<\/strong>\nBy a 4:1 majority, a five-judge Constitution Bench held that Sec. 34 and Sec. 37 courts possess a limited power to modify an award, overruling the earlier absolute &#8220;no-modification&#8221; reading. The dissent warned that this risks the finality arbitration is meant to deliver. The practical upshot is a narrow, defined corrective power, not a general right to rewrite awards.<\/p>\n<p><strong>15. What is the difference between Sec. 34 and Sec. 37?<\/strong>\nSec. 34 is the original challenge to set aside an award; Sec. 37 is the appeal from the order passed on that Sec. 34 challenge. There is no second appeal from a Sec. 37 order, although a special leave petition to the Supreme Court under Article 136 lies. In short: Sec. 34 is round one in court, Sec. 37 is the appeal.<\/p>\n<p><strong>16. How is challenging a domestic award (Sec. 34) different from resisting a foreign award (Sec. 48)?<\/strong>\nA domestic or India-seated award is challenged under Sec. 34 in Part I. A foreign-seated award is not challenged under Sec. 34 at all; the resisting party objects to its enforcement under Sec. 48 in Part II, on grounds that track the New York Convention. Using Sec. 34 against a foreign award is a category error.<\/p>\n<p><strong>17. Does filing a Sec. 34 petition automatically stay the award?<\/strong>\nNo. Since the amendment to Sec. 36, merely filing a challenge does not stay enforcement. To halt enforcement you must file a separate Sec. 36(2) stay application, and the court will usually condition any stay on a deposit or bank guarantee, granting an unconditional stay only where the award is prima facie tainted by fraud or corruption.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"key-takeaways\">Key takeaways<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>The grounds under Sec. 34 are limited and exhaustive: party-proven defects (34(2)(a)), court-determined grounds including public policy (34(2)(b)), and patent illegality for domestic awards only (34(2A)). A &#8220;wrong&#8221; award is not a ground.<\/li>\n<li>The deadline is strict: three months from receipt of the signed award, extendable by up to 30 days for sufficient cause, and &#8220;but not thereafter,&#8221; with no rescue from court vacations.<\/li>\n<li>There is no automatic stay. Filing a Sec. 34 petition does not freeze enforcement; you must separately move under Sec. 36(2), usually on a deposit or bank-guarantee condition.<\/li>\n<li>Courts can now modify in a limited way. After the 2025 Constitution Bench decision, courts may sever the invalid part, fix clerical and computational errors, and adjust post-award interest, but cannot re-decide the award.<\/li>\n<li>Sec. 34 is not Sec. 37 is not Sec. 36: challenge, appeal, and enforcement are three distinct mechanisms, and foreign awards are resisted under Sec. 48, not challenged under Sec. 34.<\/li>\n<li>File correctly: compute limitation from receipt, choose the right forum, serve the Sec. 34(5) notice, plead grounds against the precise sub-clause, and file with a properly stamped award.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n<h2 id=\"references\">References<\/h2>\n<h3>Case Law<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/31621011\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49<\/a>. Supreme Court of India, 25 November 2014.<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/80534060\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 131<\/a>. Supreme Court of India, 5 May 2022 (restraint standard for Sec. 34 review).<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/88353968\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 INSC 292<\/a>. Supreme Court of India (curative petition), 10 April 2024.<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/111751006\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2025 INSC 605<\/a>. Supreme Court of India, 5-judge Constitution Bench (4:1), 30 April 2025.<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/65585365\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">My Preferred Transformation &amp; Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., 2025 INSC 56<\/a>. Supreme Court of India, 10 January 2025.<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/919241\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705<\/a>. Supreme Court of India, 17 April 2003.<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/98965625\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem, (2021) 9 SCC 1<\/a>. Supreme Court of India, 20 July 2021.<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/95111828\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Ssangyong Engineering &amp; Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131<\/a>. Supreme Court of India, 8 May 2019.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Statutes<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.indiacode.nic.in\/handle\/123456789\/1978\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996<\/a>: Sec. 34, Sec. 34(2)(a), Sec. 34(2)(b), Sec. 34(2A), Sec. 34(3), Sec. 34(4), Sec. 34(5), Sec. 36, Sec. 36(2), Sec. 37, Sec. 48.<\/li>\n<li>The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Acts, 2015, 2019, and 2021.<\/li>\n<li>The Limitation Act, 1963.<\/li>\n<li>The Constitution of India, Article 136 and Article 142.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr>\n<p>This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. 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Sec. 34(5) requires prior notice of the application to the other party, accompanied by an affidavit endorsing compliance filed with the petition. It is a step that is easy to miss and a recurring reason petitions get held up at the filing stage.\"\n      }\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"Question\",\n      \"name\": \"How long does a Sec. 34 case take to be decided?\",\n      \"acceptedAnswer\": {\n        \"@type\": \"Answer\",\n        \"text\": \"There is no fixed answer, and timelines vary by court, docket load, and complexity, but disposal can run into years rather than months in busy jurisdictions. Reducing these timelines is one of the stated aims behind proposed reforms, though those proposals are not yet law.\"\n      }\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"Question\",\n      \"name\": \"Can a court modify an arbitral award under Sec. 34?\",\n      \"acceptedAnswer\": {\n        \"@type\": \"Answer\",\n        \"text\": \"Until 2025 the answer was a flat no: a court could set aside or uphold, never modify. After the 2025 Constitution Bench decision, courts now have a limited power to modify, confined to severing the invalid part, correcting clerical or computational errors, adjusting post-award interest, and the Supreme Court's sparing use of Article 142. It is not a power to re-decide the award.\"\n      }\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"Question\",\n      \"name\": \"What did Gayatri Balasamy (2025) decide about modifying awards?\",\n      \"acceptedAnswer\": {\n        \"@type\": \"Answer\",\n        \"text\": \"By a 4:1 majority, a five-judge Constitution Bench held that Sec. 34 and Sec. 37 courts possess a limited power to modify an award, overruling the earlier absolute \\\"no-modification\\\" reading. The dissent warned that this risks the finality arbitration is meant to deliver. The practical upshot is a narrow, defined corrective power, not a general right to rewrite awards.\"\n      }\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"Question\",\n      \"name\": \"What is the difference between Sec. 34 and Sec. 37?\",\n      \"acceptedAnswer\": {\n        \"@type\": \"Answer\",\n        \"text\": \"Sec. 34 is the original challenge to set aside an award; Sec. 37 is the appeal from the order passed on that Sec. 34 challenge. There is no second appeal from a Sec. 37 order, although a special leave petition to the Supreme Court under Article 136 lies. In short: Sec. 34 is round one in court, Sec. 37 is the appeal.\"\n      }\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"Question\",\n      \"name\": \"How is challenging a domestic award (Sec. 34) different from resisting a foreign award (Sec. 48)?\",\n      \"acceptedAnswer\": {\n        \"@type\": \"Answer\",\n        \"text\": \"A domestic or India-seated award is challenged under Sec. 34 in Part I. A foreign-seated award is not challenged under Sec. 34 at all; the resisting party objects to its enforcement under Sec. 48 in Part II, on grounds that track the New York Convention. Using Sec. 34 against a foreign award is a category error.\"\n      }\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"Question\",\n      \"name\": \"Does filing a Sec. 34 petition automatically stay the award?\",\n      \"acceptedAnswer\": {\n        \"@type\": \"Answer\",\n        \"text\": \"No. Since the amendment to Sec. 36, merely filing a challenge does not stay enforcement. To halt enforcement you must file a separate Sec. 36(2) stay application, and the court will usually condition any stay on a deposit or bank guarantee, granting an unconditional stay only where the award is prima facie tainted by fraud or corruption.\"\n      }\n    }\n  ]\n}\n<\/script>\n\n\n\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\">\n{\n  \"@context\": \"https:\/\/schema.org\",\n  \"@type\": \"HowTo\",\n  \"name\": \"How to File a Sec. 34 Petition to Challenge an Arbitral Award\",\n  \"description\": \"A step-by-step workflow to file a Section 34 petition to set aside a domestic arbitral award in India and survive the first hearing.\",\n  \"step\": [\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"HowToStep\",\n      \"name\": \"Compute the limitation window\",\n      \"text\": \"Count three months from the date you received the signed copy of the award, not the award date. Diarise the deadline immediately, and treat the additional 30-day condonable period as already gone. Aim to file inside the three months.\",\n      \"position\": 1\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"HowToStep\",\n      \"name\": \"Identify the correct forum\",\n      \"text\": \"File before the court of competent jurisdiction. For a specified-value commercial dispute, that is the Commercial Court or the Commercial Division of the High Court; for other disputes, the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the district. Pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction both matter, so confirm both before filing.\",\n      \"position\": 2\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"HowToStep\",\n      \"name\": \"Serve prior notice under Sec. 34(5)\",\n      \"text\": \"Issue prior notice of the application to the other party, and file an affidavit endorsing compliance with this requirement along with the petition. This step is easy to overlook and a recurring reason petitions get held up at filing.\",\n      \"position\": 3\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"HowToStep\",\n      \"name\": \"Draft the petition and plead the grounds with specificity\",\n      \"text\": \"Tie each ground to a precise statutory sub-clause: 34(2)(a), 34(2)(b), or 34(2A). Do not plead that the award is wrong. Plead the structural, public-policy, or patent-illegality defect and show how it goes to the root. Annex the award copy and the relevant arbitration record.\",\n      \"position\": 4\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"HowToStep\",\n      \"name\": \"Pay the court fee and ensure the award is adequately stamped\",\n      \"text\": \"Pay the prescribed court fee, and make sure the arbitral award carries the correct stamp duty. An inadequately stamped award is a classic day-one defect, and stamp duty on an award can have ad valorem implications depending on the State and the amount.\",\n      \"position\": 5\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"HowToStep\",\n      \"name\": \"File, and separately move a Sec. 36(2) stay application if you need to halt enforcement\",\n      \"text\": \"Remember the automatic-stay myth: the challenge alone does not stop execution. If you need enforcement frozen, file the Sec. 36(2) application at the same time.\",\n      \"position\": 6\n    },\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"HowToStep\",\n      \"name\": \"Appear, and argue on the record\",\n      \"text\": \"The court decides the challenge on the existing arbitration record. There is no fresh evidence and no merits re-trial. Be ready to argue your pleaded grounds against the record, not to re-run the dispute.\",\n      \"position\": 7\n    }\n  ]\n}\n<\/script>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Last verified: 2026-06-22 A private concessionaire and a metro operator fought over a city rail line, and the dispute went to arbitration. The concessionaire won big. The award ran into&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":40,"featured_media":6589,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1808],"tags":[1805,1803,1802,124,1806,1804,1807],"class_list":["post-6588","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-adv-contract-drafting-negotiation-dr","tag-arbitration-limitation-period","tag-gayatri-balasamy-2025","tag-patent-illegality","tag-section-34-arbitration","tag-section-36-enforcement","tag-set-aside-arbitral-award","tag-stay-of-arbitral-award"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6588","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/40"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6588"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6588\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6590,"href":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6588\/revisions\/6590"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6589"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6588"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6588"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawsikho.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6588"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}