How to Quash an FIR in India: Section 528 BNSS, Inherent Powers and Quashing Petitions (2026)

Last verified: 2026-04-18

The FIR arrived on a Tuesday in September 2025. A litigant based in India had been locked in a custody dispute before foreign courts for over two years. That same week, the foreign court ruled decisively, rejecting the spouse’s application. Within days of that ruling, a criminal complaint was filed at a police station in India. The allegation: cruelty under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The litigant had no prior criminal record. There had been no complaint of cruelty at any point across two years of contested proceedings abroad.

What followed was predictable. An FIR was registered. The litigant received notice of an impending arrest. A bail application had to be filed. Multiple court appearances were scheduled. Employers were informed. What had been a civil matrimonial dispute was now, on paper at least, a criminal matter. The litigant hadn’t changed. The circumstances hadn’t changed. But the accusation, and the machinery it set in motion, was entirely new.

The accused’s lawyers identified the situation immediately: a counterblast FIR. The criminal complaint had been filed not out of genuine grievance, but as a tactical weapon in a broader dispute. The question was whether any legal remedy could stop it.

The first response was a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). This is the provision that gives the High Court the power to quash criminal proceedings when continuing them would be an abuse of the court’s process. The High Court applied the standard test: does the FIR, taken at face value, disclose a prima facie offence? The court found that it technically did. The FIR alleged acts that, if true, would constitute Section 498A. Petition dismissed.

The case went to the Supreme Court. The accused’s lawyers didn’t argue that the allegations were false. They argued something more precise: that the full context, taken together, showed that the proceedings were an abuse. The timing of the complaint. The fact that it was filed days after an adverse ruling abroad. The complete absence of any prior complaint of cruelty across two years of contested litigation. The Supreme Court agreed. Applying the contextual analysis framework it had reaffirmed in Mahmood Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 INSC 684 two years earlier, the bench held that courts aren’t confined to the “four corners” of the FIR. The broader pattern can and must be examined when abuse of process is alleged. The FIR was quashed.

That ruling, Nitin Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, 2025 INSC 1128, decided in September 2025, captures what Section 528 BNSS is and why it matters. It isn’t a provision that routinely stops investigations. Courts are conservative about using it. But when the criminal process is being weaponised, this is the tool that can end it. And with India’s shift from the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), practitioners and litigants alike need to know which provision applies, what it requires, and how to use it effectively.

This is that guide.

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Under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the direct successor to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), a High Court may quash an FIR, charge sheet, or criminal proceeding when continuing it would abuse the court’s process, when the FIR prima facie discloses no cognisable offence, or when a genuine settlement between private parties removes the foundation of the case.

The sections below break down the law in detail: what Section 528 BNSS covers, the grounds courts recognise, the judicial tests they apply, when quashing succeeds (and when it doesn’t), and a step-by-step guide to filing a petition.

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What is Section 528 BNSS? (Inherent powers of the High Court)

Inherent powers. The phrase sounds almost ceremonial, but the practical scope is significant. Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 gives the High Court authority to make “such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

The language isn’t new. It’s almost identical to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the provision it replaces. That’s deliberate: the legislature didn’t want to disturb fifty years of case law built around the inherent powers of High Courts. The savings clause in Section 531 BNSS makes this explicit — proceedings already pending under the CrPC continue to be governed by the CrPC.

What this power allows, in practical terms, is for a High Court to step in and end a criminal proceeding (an FIR, a charge sheet, a prosecution) when allowing it to continue would produce an unjust result that no other provision can address. That’s why practitioners call it the “last resort” provision. It’s extraordinary. Courts exercise it carefully. But it exists precisely because the legislature understood that no code of procedure can anticipate every situation where justice requires the court to act.

Section 482 CrPC to Section 528 BNSS: what changed and what didn’t

Here’s the historical picture. Section 482 of the CrPC, 1973 preserved the inherent powers of High Courts in almost identical language to this new provision. Thirty-five years of Supreme Court judgments built a detailed framework around it: when it applies, what thresholds must be met, what tests govern its exercise. All of that case law carries forward under Section 528 BNSS.

What changed is the section number. And what changed alongside that is that Section 482 BNSS now means something completely different — more on that below. But the substantive scope of the inherent power is preserved unchanged. The transition mirrors what happened in 1973, when the CrPC replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Then too, a savings clause protected pending proceedings, and courts continued applying the old law to old cases for years.

The BNSS came into force on July 1, 2024. From that date, FIRs registered under the new code are governed by BNSS, and quashing petitions for those FIRs cite Section 528 BNSS. Pending proceedings registered before July 1, 2024 continue under the CrPC, and quashing petitions for those proceedings still cite Section 482 CrPC. The current dual-track period will likely last until 2028 or later, given the pace at which pre-July 2024 FIRs will work through the system.

Why Section 482 BNSS is not quashing (a common and costly confusion)

This is the most common error practitioners and litigants make when first encountering the BNSS. Section 482 BNSS governs anticipatory bail. It’s the equivalent of Section 438 of the old CrPC. If your client is apprehending arrest and wants pre-arrest bail, you file under Section 482 BNSS. If you want to quash the FIR entirely, you file under Section 528 BNSS.

Filing a quashing petition that cites Section 482 BNSS is a fatal numbering error. The court will either dismiss it at the first hearing or return it for correction. Either way, you’ve wasted time the accused may not have. And the delay can directly affect whether a “no coercive steps” order is obtained before arrest.

The complete mapping for the sections that matter:

CrPC section	Provision	BNSS section
Section 437	Bail in non-bailable offences	Section 480
Section 438	Anticipatory bail	Section 482
Section 439	Special bail powers of Sessions Court/HC	Section 483
Section 482	Inherent powers of HC (quashing)	Section 528
(none)	Savings clause (transitional provisions)	Section 531

The last row is what governs FIR quashing. Memorise it if you practice criminal law.

Which provision applies: CrPC or BNSS?

The test is simple, and the Sikkim High Court confirmed it in 2025: the applicable provision depends on when the FIR was registered, not when the petition is filed.

FIR registered before July 1, 2024: Section 482 CrPC governs, even if the petition is filed today. The court applies CrPC procedure and the full body of CrPC case law.

FIR registered on or after July 1, 2024: Section 528 BNSS governs. But here’s the practical reality: the substantive tests for quashing (Bhajan Lal, Neeharika, Mahmood Ali) apply in both frameworks. The arguments are identical. The section you cite in the petition heading must be correct, but the substance of your argument doesn’t change.

Section 528 BNSS vs Article 226 of the Constitution

A quashing petition filed under Section 528 BNSS is a criminal writ petition filed in the HC’s criminal jurisdiction. An Article 226 petition is filed in the HC’s constitutional writ jurisdiction. The two aren’t mutually exclusive — practitioners routinely plead both as alternative grounds, and courts accept this.

But here’s the practical difference. Section 528 BNSS is more flexible: there’s no requirement to exhaust other remedies first. Article 226, particularly when used to challenge criminal proceedings, attracts additional scrutiny. Section 528 BNSS is the cleaner and more commonly used route. Article 226 is typically added as an alternative for cases involving state action or fundamental rights violations where the constitutional dimension strengthens the argument.

Grounds for quashing an FIR under Section 528 BNSS

Not every badly motivated FIR qualifies for quashing. The remedy is extraordinary by design. Courts have been consistent about this since State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: inherent powers aren’t a general supervisory power over police investigations. They’re a targeted tool for specific situations where justice cannot be served any other way.

The real question every petition must answer at the outset is: which category of the Bhajan Lal framework does this case fall within? If you can’t answer that, the petition isn’t ready.

The seven Bhajan Lal categories (1990)

In the Bhajan Lal ruling, decided in November 1990, the Supreme Court laid down seven categories of cases in which the High Court’s inherent powers may properly be exercised to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding. The categories are illustrative, not exhaustive — the court was clear about this — but 35 years of practice has consolidated around them.

At the time, the ruling addressed a sitting Chief Minister accused of disproportionate assets. The court quashed the FIR and, in doing so, created a framework that every subsequent quashing case has had to engage with. No case decided after 1990 has departed from these categories; they’ve only been refined.

The seven categories:

1. The allegations in the FIR or complaint, even if taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, do not make out the offence alleged.
2. The allegations and the evidence on record do not disclose a cognisable offence justifying investigation by police.
3. The uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR and the evidence produced do not disclose the commission of any offence and do not make out a case against the accused.
4. The allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognisable offence but only a non-cognisable offence, in which case the police cannot investigate without a Magistrate’s order.
5. The allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person could reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. A legal bar to the continuation of the proceedings exists, such as want of requisite sanction, time bar, or a statutory bar.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide intent and has been instituted for an ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the accused, with a view to causing damage.

Categories 1, 5, and 7 are the most litigated. Category 7 is the “abuse of process” ground — it’s the category that counterblast FIRs and civil-dispute-dressed-as-crime cases most commonly engage.

The two-layered test for quashing

The two-layered test is the modern distillation of the Bhajan Lal framework. Practitioners use it as a filter before advising a client whether to file at all.

Layer 1: Does the FIR, taken at face value and accepted as entirely true, prima facie disclose a cognisable offence? If the answer is no, the petition should proceed with confidence. The FIR is defective on its face.

Layer 2: Even if the answer to Layer 1 is yes, does continuing the proceedings nonetheless amount to an abuse of the court’s process or fail to secure the ends of justice? This is where most of the interesting litigation happens. A well-drafted FIR can technically disclose an offence while the entire proceeding is still an abuse. The contextual analysis from Mahmood Ali applies at this layer.

The practical reality is that Layer 1 cases are relatively straightforward. It’s the Layer 2 analysis where a good advocate makes the difference.

Quashing a charge sheet vs quashing an FIR: the distinction

When an accused seeks to quash the FIR at the pre-charge-sheet stage, the court looks only at the FIR itself. The allegations are taken at face value. The court doesn’t examine police investigation materials, witness statements, or the accused’s defence — those aren’t before the court at this stage.

Once a charge sheet has been filed, the picture changes. The court now examines the charge sheet (challan) together with the FIR. The question shifts from “what does the FIR allege” to “what does the accumulated pre-trial material show.” Courts are more reluctant to quash post-charge-sheet because the Magistrate has already taken cognizance, meaning a judicial officer has already applied their mind to the case.

Post-cognizance quashing requires showing that even the full accumulated material cannot possibly result in a conviction, or that a genuine settlement has been reached. That’s a harder argument, but it’s not impossible — particularly in matrimonial cases where a settlement was reached after the charge sheet was filed.

The judicial tests courts apply

Knowing which Bhajan Lal category your case falls into is necessary but not sufficient. Courts don’t apply Bhajan Lal in a vacuum. They apply a set of judicial frameworks developed over the past 15 years that govern how they analyse the material before them.

Three frameworks dominate: the Neeharika restraint principle, the Mahmood Ali contextual analysis, and the Rajiv Thapar four-step test. Understanding how they interact is where the real practitioner skill lies.

The Neeharika restraint principle (2021): when courts hold back

In 2021, the Supreme Court issued a corrective ruling in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401 that significantly raised the practical threshold for quashing. The court was concerned that High Courts had been too freely granting stays of investigation and quashing at the first hearing without proper scrutiny.

Three principles emerged. First, High Courts must not conduct mini-trials at the quashing stage. The court isn’t there to assess the truthfulness of allegations; it checks whether the allegations, if true, disclose an offence. Second, quashing is reserved for the rarest of rare cases where no purpose will be served by continuing the proceedings. Third, routine stays of investigation (the “no coercive steps” orders) should not be granted without genuine prima facie examination.

What most people miss is that Neeharika didn’t change the legal test. It changed the culture of how courts approach the test. The Bhajan Lal categories still apply. But the bar for initial entertainment of a petition was raised, and many quashing petitions that would have been entertained in 2019 were dismissed in 2022 and 2023. Practitioners had to work harder to get interim protection at first hearing.

Mahmood Ali and contextual analysis (2023): reading between the lines

Two years after Neeharika, the Supreme Court corrected the overcorrection.

In Mahmood Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 INSC 684, decided in August 2023, the court held that a High Court isn’t confined to the “four corners” of the FIR when abuse of process is alleged. Courts may, and in some cases must, examine the broader factual context to determine whether continuing the proceedings would constitute an abuse. The timing of the FIR, the surrounding circumstances, the pattern of litigation — all of this is relevant material.

This doesn’t mean courts can conduct trials at the quashing stage. Neeharika’s prohibition on mini-trials stands. But there’s a critical difference between examining broader context (permitted) and resolving contested questions of fact (not permitted). Mahmood Ali drew that distinction more clearly and gave advocates a sharper tool for counterblast and contextual cases.

For practitioners, the shift matters. A petition filed after a 2024 FIR has a stronger contextual argument available than the same petition filed under the post-Neeharika conservatism of 2022.

The Rajiv Thapar four-step test for evidence-based quashing

Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, decided in January 2013, addresses a specific scenario: the accused wants to rely on their own documents to demonstrate that the prosecution’s case cannot succeed. This is a different animal from the standard FIR-face-value analysis.

The four steps, all of which must be satisfied cumulatively:

1. Would the allegations in the FIR or complaint, even if taken as proved, constitute the offence the accused is charged with?
2. Is there any uncontroverted evidence so overwhelming that the court is satisfied no reasonable person could convict on it?
3. Does the evidence produced by the defence completely destroy the prosecution’s case?
4. Only if all three prior steps are satisfied does the court proceed to quash using the defence material.

Step 3 is the hardest hurdle. The defence material must “completely destroy” the prosecution’s case, not merely raise doubt. Most quashing petitions rely on the FIR’s face-value analysis rather than defence documentary material. But in commercial fraud cases where the accused has clear contracts, bank records, or correspondence that prove no fraud occurred, the Rajiv Thapar test is the right framework.

When courts will quash and when they won’t

The abstract frameworks above become clearer when applied to real fact patterns. India’s criminal courts have produced a detailed body of case law across four recurring scenarios. Each has its own dynamics, and what works in one category doesn’t automatically transfer to another.

Matrimonial cases: Section 498A / Section 85 BNS and settlement quashing

Section 498A of the IPC (now Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) is the most frequently litigated category in quashing petitions. Cruelty cases arising from matrimonial disputes are non-compoundable offences under Indian law, meaning the parties can’t, as a matter of law, privately settle and withdraw the complaint. But courts have long recognised that the formal legal position doesn’t capture the reality of matrimonial disputes.

In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Supreme Court held that quashing on the basis of a genuine settlement is permissible in non-compoundable offences where the matter is “essentially private in nature” and no larger public interest is served by continuing. Most Section 498A cases fall within this category. A genuine settlement between the spouses, reflected in a consent deed and accompanied by an affidavit confirming voluntary consent, is a strong ground for quashing.

The 2025 ruling in Sanjay D. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 1168 added another important ground: omnibus allegations. Where an FIR against in-laws or extended family members uses near-identical language for all accused, attributes no specific act, date, or role to any individual, and appears to cast the widest possible net, courts will quash. “Omnibus and general allegations” is now a recognised standalone ground in matrimonial cases, separate from the settlement analysis.

The catch? Settlement quashing requires genuine consent. Courts probe for coercion, particularly where the accused has significantly more bargaining power. And a genuine settlement still won’t guarantee quashing if the FIR discloses specific, well-documented acts of cruelty with names, dates, and circumstances.

Civil disputes dressed as criminal cases

This is Bhajan Lal Category 7 in its clearest application. The Supreme Court has consistently held that an FIR filed to enforce a civil obligation — a property title dispute, a contractual claim, a debt recovery — constitutes an abuse of process and must be quashed. Strip away the criminal language in the FIR, and what remains is a civil obligation. A claim to title over property. A contractual right. A debt. These cannot be transformed into criminal offences by the choice of words in a complaint.

The test courts apply is straightforward: take the FIR, accept every allegation as true, and remove the words “cheated,” “fraudulently,” and “dishonestly.” What’s left? If what remains is a civil dispute (a broken contract, a disputed payment, a property title), the criminal process is being misused.

In practice, this category covers cheque disputes filed as Section 420 IPC / Section 318 BNS fraud, construction disputes filed as criminal trespass, and vendor payment disputes filed as criminal breach of trust. The key question is always the same: is there genuinely criminal intent (mens rea), or is this a civil obligation dressed in criminal language?

Counterblast FIRs and omnibus allegations

The Nitin Ahluwalia case from the story hook is the clearest recent illustration of this category.

A counterblast FIR is one filed in retaliation to another legal proceeding. The timing is often the most telling evidence. An FIR filed the week after an adverse ruling in a foreign court, or days after the accused filed a complaint against the complainant, or immediately following a business dispute — these patterns tell a story that courts are now willing to read under the Mahmood Ali framework.

The question isn’t just “does the FIR allege something technically illegal?” It’s “does the full context show that the criminal process is being weaponised rather than used in good faith?” That’s the analysis Nitin Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, 2025 INSC 1128 endorsed. And it’s the analysis that, in the right case, produces quashing even when the FIR technically discloses an offence on its face.

Omnibus allegations are a related but distinct category. Where all named accused in an FIR — including relatives, neighbours, colleagues — are attributed the same acts in the same language, courts treat this as a formulaic filing rather than a genuine complaint. Specific individuals need specific allegations with specific acts, dates, and circumstances. The absence of specificity is, by itself, evidence that the FIR is a dragnet rather than a genuine criminal complaint.

Economic offences, cheque dishonour, and NDPS: the harder cases

Not all categories are equally amenable to quashing.

NDPS Act proceedings are perhaps the hardest to quash. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 covers offences that courts treat as affecting society at large. Private settlement is irrelevant. Technical defects in the FIR are scrutinised more narrowly. Courts’ reluctance to interfere reflects a legislative policy that drug offences should be prosecuted firmly.

Economic offences involving state institutions, Enforcement Directorate proceedings, and large-scale commercial fraud face a similar elevated threshold. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that economic offences undermine public financial systems and deserve rigorous prosecution. Settlement quashing is much harder to achieve in this category.

Cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 sits at the other end of the spectrum. It’s fundamentally a civil obligation: pay what you owe. Settlement between the drawer and payee has routinely been accepted as grounds for quashing Section 138 proceedings, even though it’s technically a criminal offence.

Worth flagging for corporate practitioners: as commercial disputes increase, so does the tactic of filing criminal FIRs to force business settlements. In-house counsel at mid-to-large companies increasingly need a first-response quashing strategy ready when a director or key executive is named in a Section 318 BNS FIR arising from a vendor or counterparty dispute. That’s no longer purely a criminal litigation problem; it’s a corporate risk management issue.

How to file a quashing petition under Section 528 BNSS

The law and the strategy are only as useful as the procedure. Here’s the practical process, from filing to final disposal.

Which court has jurisdiction

The petition must be filed in the High Court of the state where the FIR was registered. That’s the rule, and it doesn’t bend. Sessions Courts and Magistrates do not have inherent powers. Section 528 BNSS, like Section 482 CrPC before it, is exclusively a High Court provision.

The Supreme Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 32, but this is reserved for genuinely rare situations — typically where multiple FIRs in different states arise from the same facts and the Supreme Court needs to consolidate matters or prevent contradictory orders.

For a cross-state scenario: if the FIR is registered in Maharashtra but the accused lives in Karnataka, the petition is filed at the Bombay High Court (the HC of the state where the FIR is registered), not the Karnataka High Court. The accused will need to engage local counsel in Maharashtra. Where there are multiple FIRs in different states arising from the same transaction, separate petitions in each HC is the standard approach, though a consolidation application before the Supreme Court is possible (and expensive).

Drafting checklist: what the petition must contain

A quashing petition that fails at the first hearing usually has one of two problems: wrong section cited, or missing components. Here is the complete checklist:

1. Caption and court heading: “In the High Court of [State] at [City] / Writ Petition (Criminal) No. ___ of [Year]” — some HCs use “Misc. Criminal Case” instead; check local practice
2. Parties: Petitioner (the accused), Respondent No. 1 (State/UT through its Secretary), Respondent No. 2 (the complainant or informant)
3. Jurisdiction paragraph: Cite Section 528 BNSS (or Section 482 CrPC if the FIR predates July 1, 2024) and Articles 226/227 of the Constitution as alternative/concurrent grounds
4. Facts section: FIR number, date, police station, offences alleged, date of registration, current stage of proceedings (investigation/charge sheet/cognizance)
5. Annexure A: Certified copy of the FIR — mandatory; the petition isn’t complete without it
6. Annexure B: Copy of the charge sheet if one has been filed
7. Grounds section: Each ground stated separately, mapped explicitly to a Bhajan Lal category, with supporting argument — don’t combine multiple grounds in a single paragraph
8. Contextual material (if invoking Mahmood Ali): A clearly presented timeline of events showing the pattern of conduct; the FIR’s timing relative to other proceedings
9. Rajiv Thapar material (if relevant): Documentary evidence proving the accused’s innocence, accompanied by argument on all four test steps
10. Settlement deed and affidavit (if applicable): For matrimonial cases, a notarised settlement agreement executed by both parties with an affidavit confirming voluntary consent
11. Prayer: Specifically pray for (a) quashing of the FIR; (b) quashing of all proceedings arising from the FIR; (c) in the interim, stay of investigation / no coercive steps pending final disposal
12. Verification and supporting affidavit: Affidavit from the petitioner verifying the facts as stated

Notice to the state and complainant; the “no coercive steps” order

After filing, the HC will schedule a first hearing. At that hearing, the court decides whether to issue notice to the Respondents and whether to grant interim protection.

The complainant’s right to be heard matters here. Courts can’t quash an FIR over the complainant’s active objection without specifically engaging with that objection. If the other side is going to contest, you need to know early — and you need to have answered their likely arguments in your petition already.

The “no coercive steps” order is a court direction prohibiting the police from arresting the accused pending the petition. Post-Neeharika, these aren’t given automatically. The court will check whether the petition raises genuinely serious grounds, whether the accused has been cooperating with any investigation, and whether pre-trial arrest would cause irreversible harm.

What to argue at the first hearing to secure this protection: identify the strongest Bhajan Lal category your case falls within and present it concisely (not the whole petition, just the clearest ground). Show that the accused has a clean record and no flight risk. Show that the alleged offence doesn’t fall in a category where courts uniformly refuse protection (NDPS, serious violence, state-affecting economic fraud). If you don’t get it at the first hearing, you can renew the application, but you’ll need additional material the second time.

What happens after the petition: rejection, appeal, effect on co-accused

If the HC dismisses the quashing petition, the next step is a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. There’s no right of appeal as such — you’re asking the court for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court grants leave where the HC’s order raises a substantial question of law or where injustice is apparent.

A successive petition on identical grounds before the same HC isn’t maintainable. Res judicata principles apply. You’ll need either the SLP route or materially new facts (a subsequent Supreme Court ruling changing the legal position, or a settlement that didn’t exist at the time of the first petition) before refiling.

Effect on co-accused: this is frequently misunderstood. An order quashing the FIR “as against the petitioner” does not automatically extend to co-accused who didn’t petition. Each accused must be named as a petitioner with an independent prayer, or must file a separate petition. If you’re representing multiple co-accused, file one petition naming all of them, with a separate prayer for each individual. Don’t assume that success for the primary accused covers everyone else.

The 2024-2025 constitutional picture

The BNSS has been in force for just over a year. The courts are still working out some significant questions, and practitioners need to know which parts of the law are settled and which aren’t.

CrPC to BNSS transition: which law governs your case

The starting point is Section 531 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the savings clause. It reads that “all proceedings pending before any court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall be continued under the said Code.” Section 482 CrPC petitions filed before July 1, 2024 continue under the old law. So do FIR-based proceedings registered before that date.

What the savings clause doesn’t fully resolve is the scenario where an FIR was registered in 2022 under the CrPC but the quashing petition is filed in 2025. In that case, the applicable law is CrPC (because the FIR date governs), but the petition is being heard today under a court system now nominally governed by BNSS. The Sikkim HC’s 2025 ruling on this point is the clearest judicial authority currently available and confirms that FIR date governs.

A parallel situation arose in the 1970s when the CrPC replaced the 1898 Code. Courts spent years working out which law applied to which proceedings. The current transition will follow the same pattern, and there will almost certainly be HC rulings in 2026 and 2027 clarifying edge cases that aren’t yet resolved.

The Allahabad HC 9-judge bench referral: the open constitutional question

This is the most significant live development in quashing jurisprudence, and it’s worth understanding carefully.

In 2025, a division bench of the Allahabad High Court referred the following question to a larger bench of nine judges: “Can a High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 528 BNSS (or Section 482 CrPC), quash both the FIR and the consequential investigation simultaneously? Or can it quash only the FIR, with the investigation continuing independently?”

The question matters more than it might seem. Currently, when a court quashes an FIR, it’s understood that the investigation also stops because there’s nothing left to investigate. But if the 9-judge bench holds that the investigation can continue independently of the FIR, then quashing becomes a more limited remedy. The accused might still face continued investigation, surveillance, and ultimately a fresh charge sheet under a new FIR.

No ruling has been issued as of April 2026. Practitioners advising clients today should flag this uncertainty explicitly in their advice.

What the pending ruling means for practitioners

Three downstream consequences, depending on how the bench rules.

If the bench holds that investigation can continue after FIR quashing: the value of a quashing petition narrows for accused persons primarily concerned with stopping investigation. The “no coercive steps” interim order becomes more important as a standalone protective mechanism. Bail strategy and anticipatory bail planning becomes a more critical parallel track.

If the bench holds that FIR quashing also terminates the investigation (the current understanding): practice continues largely unchanged, and the remedy retains its full practical scope.

Either way, defence lawyers with pending Section 482 CrPC petitions and new Section 528 BNSS petitions are now managing two parallel frameworks simultaneously. That’s not going away anytime soon, and the demand for competence in both codes is immediate. For corporate in-house counsel: advising a board on the options available when a director is named in a commercial FIR is now meaningfully more complex than it was two years ago.

Frequently asked questions

What is Section 528 BNSS?

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 gives the High Court the power to make orders necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. It is the direct successor to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and preserves the same inherent powers in almost identical language.

Is Section 482 CrPC replaced by Section 528 BNSS?

For FIRs registered on or after July 1, 2024, yes. Section 528 BNSS is the governing provision. For FIRs registered before that date, Section 482 CrPC continues to apply per the savings clause in Section 531 BNSS, regardless of when the petition is filed.

What is the difference between quashing and anticipatory bail?

Quashing under Section 528 BNSS permanently terminates the FIR and all proceedings arising from it. Anticipatory bail under Section 482 BNSS is a pre-arrest bail order that protects you from immediate arrest but doesn’t stop the investigation or the eventual proceedings. They’re completely different remedies governed by different sections.

Can a Sessions Court or Magistrate exercise inherent powers to quash an FIR?

No. Inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS (and Section 482 CrPC before it) are exclusive to High Courts. Sessions Courts and Magistrates don’t have this power.

What are the main grounds for quashing an FIR in India?

The seven Bhajan Lal categories from the 1990 Supreme Court ruling remain the governing framework. The key grounds: FIR discloses no cognisable offence on its face; allegations are inherently improbable; a legal bar exists to continuation; proceedings are manifestly mala fide; and civil dispute has been dressed as a criminal case. All quashing arguments must connect to one or more of these categories.

Can an FIR be quashed after a charge sheet is filed?

Yes, but the threshold is higher. Post-charge-sheet quashing requires showing that even the accumulated material in the FIR plus charge sheet cannot possibly lead to conviction, or that a genuine settlement has been reached between the parties. Courts are more reluctant to interfere after the Magistrate has taken cognizance.

Can a compromise or settlement lead to quashing of a non-compoundable offence?

Under the Gian Singh framework, yes, in cases where the offence is “essentially private in nature” and no larger public interest is served by continuing. Section 498A / Section 85 BNS matrimonial cases are the most common example. But the settlement must be genuine — courts examine consent carefully and probe for coercion.

Can a civil dispute disguised as a criminal case be quashed?

Yes. Where the underlying substance is a civil obligation (a debt, a contractual dispute, a property title), courts will quash. The test: take the FIR, accept every allegation as true, and remove the criminal language. If what remains is purely civil in nature, the criminal process is being misused.

In which court is a quashing petition filed?

In the High Court of the state where the FIR was registered. Sessions Courts and Magistrates don’t have this jurisdiction. Where multiple FIRs in different states arise from the same facts, you can file separate petitions in each HC or a consolidation application before the Supreme Court.

What documents are needed to file a quashing petition?

At minimum: a certified copy of the FIR (mandatory), copy of the charge sheet if filed, supporting affidavit from the petitioner, settlement deed and consent affidavit if applicable, and the full grounds argument. The petition must cite the correct provision and include specific prayers for quashing and interim protection.

How long does the quashing process typically take?

There’s no fixed timeline. In High Courts with heavy criminal pendency (Allahabad, Calcutta), hearings can stretch over 12-24 months. In faster courts (Delhi, Bombay), final disposal within 6-12 months is more common. Interim “no coercive steps” orders can be obtained at the first hearing if the case is strong, providing protection during the wait.

What happens if a quashing petition is rejected by the High Court?

The next step is a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. A successive petition on identical grounds before the same HC isn’t maintainable. You’ll need either the SLP route or materially new facts before refiling.

Does quashing an FIR prevent the state from filing a fresh FIR on the same facts?

Generally, yes. Quashing extinguishes the proceeding, and the state can’t simply revive the same FIR. If genuinely new evidence comes to light that wasn’t available at the time of quashing, a fresh FIR on the new material is theoretically possible, but this exception is narrow and rarely invoked in practice.

Can DV Act proceedings (Section 12) be quashed under Section 528 BNSS?

Section 12 proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are civil in character (filed before a Magistrate for protection orders and maintenance). Courts have taken differing views on whether Section 528 BNSS applies directly. The HC can likely exercise inherent jurisdiction if continuing the proceedings would be an abuse of process, but this is more contested territory than a standard FIR quashing.

Can NDPS Act proceedings be quashed?

In most cases, no. Courts treat NDPS offences as affecting public health and society at large. Private settlements are irrelevant, and courts are consistently reluctant to interfere absent a clear legal bar or fundamental procedural defect in the FIR.

Can a private complaint (not an FIR) be quashed under Section 528 BNSS?

Yes. Section 528 BNSS covers “proceedings” broadly, which includes private complaints filed before a Magistrate under the equivalent BNSS complaint provisions. The Bhajan Lal framework applies to these as well, and courts quash private complaints on the same grounds they would quash an FIR.

Can the state or complainant oppose a quashing petition?

Yes. Both the state (through the public prosecutor) and the complainant are respondents who can file objections and be heard. The complainant is a necessary party — courts can’t quash the FIR over the complainant’s active objection without specifically addressing those objections. Where the complainant resists, settlement alone may not be sufficient.

What is the effect of quashing on co-accused in the same FIR?

Quashing in favour of one accused doesn’t automatically extend to co-accused who didn’t petition. Each accused needs an independent prayer in the same petition or must file separately. If you’re representing multiple co-accused, include all of them as petitioners with individual prayers in a single petition — don’t assume a favourable order for the primary accused covers everyone else.

References

Case Law

1. Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303
2. Mahmood Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 INSC 684 (non-reportable)
3. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401 — AIR 2021 SC 1918
4. Nitin Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, 2025 INSC 1128 (non-reportable)
5. Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330
6. Sanjay D. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 1168 (Indian Kanoon URL pending)
7. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 — AIR 1992 SC 604

Statutes

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — section cited: 482
2. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — sections cited: 482, 528, 531
3. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 / Indian Penal Code, 1860 — sections cited: 85 BNS / 498A IPC

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This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The law described here is subject to change, and the outcome of any particular case depends on the specific facts of that case. For advice specific to your situation, consult a qualified criminal lawyer or legal professional.