Last verified: 2026-06-03

Section 413 BNSS (Old Section 372 CrPC): The Victim’s Right to Appeal Explained (2026)

A woman who had been stalked, and whose modesty had been outraged, sat in a trial court and watched the man she accused walk free. The court acquitted him. The State did not appeal. For most of independent India’s legal history, that silence would have been the end of the road, because the victim of a crime was treated as a witness and a spectator, never a party with a voice of her own.

She did something the old Code never clearly allowed an ordinary victim to do on her own. She filed an appeal against the acquittal under Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the provision that replaced Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). This was the victim’s right to appeal in action, exercised by the victim herself, without waiting for a public prosecutor to act for her.

Then came the hard questions. Did she need the court’s permission, what lawyers call leave, before she could even be heard? Which court should she go to: the Sessions Court, or straight to the High Court, and had she filed too late?

In January 2026 a Kerala High Court bench answered the first two cleanly in Soumya Gopal v. State of Kerala, 2026:KER:1470. No leave was needed. But she had to knock on the right door, and going directly to the High Court when she should have gone to the Sessions Court was a mistake that could cost her the appeal.

How did we get here? For decades only the State could challenge an acquittal under the old Section 378 CrPC, and a private complainant needed special leave to do even that. The CrPC (Amendment) Act, 2008, brought into force on 31 December 2009, changed the picture by inserting a proviso to Section 372 and a statutory definition of “victim”.

The Supreme Court entrenched that right in 2018 in Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752, holding that a victim needs no leave and that the date of the acquittal, not the date of the offence, decides whether the right applies. When the BNSS came into force on 1 July 2024, Parliament carried the proviso forward almost word for word as Section 413. The spectator had become an appellant.

That is the shift this blog unpacks. If you are a victim trying to challenge an acquittal, a payee whose cheque-bounce complaint collapsed, or a junior advocate working out where and how to file, this is the one provision you need to understand cold. We will walk through what the section says, who counts as a victim, whether you need leave, which court to file in, how much time you have, and how the right plays out for cheque-bounce cases and old CrPC matters still working their way through the system.

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Section 413 of the BNSS, 2023 gives a victim an independent right to appeal against an acquittal, a conviction for a lesser offence, or an order awarding inadequate compensation. It re-enacts the proviso to Section 372 CrPC almost verbatim. The victim needs no leave of court, but must appeal to the correct forum: the Court of Session for a Magistrate’s acquittal, the High Court for a Sessions Court acquittal.

Here is how the rest of this guide is organised. We start with the bare text and the old section it replaced, then build outward to the practical questions that decide real appeals.

What Section 413 BNSS says, and the Section 372 CrPC it replaced

For seventy-five years, a victim who disagreed with an acquittal had almost nowhere to go. The State held the keys to an appeal, and if the prosecutor shrugged, the matter ended. So what is Section 413 BNSS, and why does it change that equation? It is the BNSS provision that both states the general rule (no appeal lies except as provided) and, in its proviso, hands the victim a personal right to challenge three specific outcomes.

The text of Section 413 and its proviso: the three triggers

Section 413 of the BNSS, 2023 opens with the general bar: no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided by the BNSS or any other law in force. The substance for victims sits in the proviso. It says a victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the court acquitting the accused, convicting for a lesser offence, or imposing inadequate compensation.

Those are the three triggers, and they matter individually. An outright acquittal is the obvious one. A conviction for a lesser offence (say, the accused is convicted of a minor hurt charge when the victim says it was a grievous one) is the second. Inadequate compensation, often overlooked, is the third: a victim can appeal purely on the quantum awarded, even where the conviction itself stands.

Read the proviso closely and one phrase does heavy lifting. The appeal lies “to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court”. That single clause decides your forum, and we will return to it because it is where most victims and a fair number of advocates trip. The right is the victim’s own, not the prosecutor’s gift.

Is the language identical to Section 372 CrPC? The pari materia point

Lawyers describe two provisions that say the same thing in the same way as pari materia, meaning they stand on the same footing and are read alike. Section 413 BNSS and the proviso to Section 372 CrPC are, for practical purposes, exactly that. The grounds are the same, the no-leave structure is the same, and the forum clause is the same. And that sameness is not an accident: Parliament lifted the proviso across deliberately.

Here is the short history, because it explains why the right feels older than the BNSS itself. [HISTORICAL] Before 31 December 2009, Section 372 CrPC carried no proviso at all, and the victim had no independent appeal. The CrPC (Amendment) Act, 2008 inserted the proviso to Section 372 along with the “victim” definition in Section 2(wa) CrPC.

When the BNSS replaced the CrPC on 1 July 2024, it renumbered the proviso as Section 413 and the definition as Section 2(1)(y), but kept the operative words. The Supreme Court had already read the 2009 proviso generously in Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752, and that reading carries straight across because the language did not change.

Does Section 413 BNSS replace Section 372 CrPC? Yes, and the practical consequence is that the entire body of case law built on the old proviso (the no-leave principle, the forum rule, the date-of-acquittal test) applies to Section 413 without missing a beat. The renumbering is cosmetic; the right is continuous. That continuity is part of the broader IPC-to-BNS and CrPC-to-BNSS renumbering that has reshuffled section numbers across India’s criminal codes without rewriting the underlying law.

One numbering point trips people up early. Section 413 is the section that contains the victim’s proviso; Section 419 is the section dealing with appeals from acquittals more broadly, including the State’s appeal and the complainant’s special-leave route. Mixing the two up is the first wrong turn. But it is an easy one to avoid once you fix the numbers in your head, and we untangle it in the comparison section below.

Who counts as a “victim” under Section 2(1)(y) BNSS

The right is only as wide as the word “victim”. Plenty of people assume “victim” means “the person who filed the complaint”, and that assumption quietly sinks appeals. So who actually qualifies, and where does the definition surprise people?

The statutory definition: loss or injury, guardian and legal heir

Section 2(1)(y) of the BNSS, 2023 defines a victim as a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused has been charged. Crucially, the definition expressly includes the victim’s guardian and legal heir. That inclusion is not decorative; it is what allows a parent to act for a minor or an heir to step in for a deceased victim.

The word “injury” is read broadly. And it is not confined to physical harm: loss includes financial loss, which is the doorway through which cheque-bounce payees and defrauded businesses walk (more on that in the cheque-bounce section).

What if the victim is a minor or incapacitated and cannot litigate? The guardian limb of the definition answers that: the guardian appeals in the victim’s stead, exercising the same no-leave right.

Edge cases: companies, minors, the incapacitated, and the victim who was not the complainant

Now, here’s where it gets interesting. Can a company be a “victim”? Yes: a corporate entity that suffers financial loss from an offence, a cheating, a cheque dishonour, falls within “person” and “loss or injury”, and Indian courts have treated companies as victims for appeal purposes. The M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran, 2025 INSC 804 ruling, which we discuss in detail later, is itself a finance company asserting victim status.

The trickier edge case is the victim who was not the complainant. Picture a State-prosecuted case where the FIR was lodged by the police, the trial ran in the State’s name, and the actual injured person never formally “complained”. Does that person still get to appeal?

The answer is yes: victim status flows from suffering loss or injury, not from having signed the complaint. This is exactly the confusion that Section 413 litigation keeps surfacing, and the courts have consistently refused to shrink “victim” down to “complainant”.

The practical reality is that the first question a junior advocate should ask a walk-in client is blunt: did you suffer the loss or injury from this offence? If the answer is yes, the victim’s no-leave route is open, whether or not the client’s name sits at the top of the FIR. Get that classification wrong and you may push the client into the slower special-leave route they never needed.

The grounds on which a victim can appeal

A victim’s appeal is not a free-floating “I disagree with the judgment” remedy. It is tied to three statutory triggers, and knowing which one you are invoking shapes the entire memorandum of appeal. Why does the precise ground matter so much? Because the relief you can ask for, and the standard the appellate court applies, both flow from it.

The three statutory grounds: acquittal, lesser offence, inadequate compensation

The proviso to Section 413 BNSS permits a victim’s appeal in three situations: an order acquitting the accused, a conviction for a lesser offence than the one the victim says was made out, or an order imposing inadequate compensation on the convicted person. And these are alternatives, not cumulative conditions; any one of them opens the door.

Here’s the thing about choosing your ground: it shapes everything downstream. The acquittal ground is the heavyweight and draws the most litigation. The lesser-offence ground is narrower but real: if the trial court convicts under a minor provision when the evidence supports a graver charge, the victim can press for the conviction to be elevated.

The inadequate-compensation ground is the quiet one, and frankly, this gets overlooked. A victim can accept the conviction yet appeal solely because the compensation ordered was a token amount. The practical reality is that few appellants think to use it, which is exactly why it can catch a defendant off guard.

Court-ordered compensation vs the victim-compensation scheme: don’t appeal the wrong number

Worth flagging: the compensation a court orders the convict to pay under the BNSS is different from a victim’s claim under the State’s victim-compensation scheme. The Section 413 ground targets the inadequacy of the court-ordered compensation in the judgment itself; the separate statutory scheme is a welfare entitlement administered by the State Legal Services Authority. A victim can, in practice, pursue both, but the appeal under Section 413 bites only on what the criminal court awarded. Confusing the two leads victims to appeal the wrong number.

There is a quieter payoff to the lesser-offence and compensation grounds: they let a victim accept part of a judgment while challenging the rest. You are not forced to attack the whole verdict. That selectivity is what makes the right genuinely useful and not just symbolic.

Do you need leave to appeal? The settled answer

This is the question that generates the most confused advice, and the most bounced appeals. Some practitioners, working from muscle memory of the old complainant rule, assume every victim must first beg the court’s permission. But they are wrong, and the law on this is now about as settled as Indian criminal procedure gets.

Why no leave is needed: the proviso is a standalone right

Leave, in this context, means special permission from the court before the appeal can proceed, the gate that Section 378(4) CrPC (now Section 419(4) BNSS) imposes on a complainant’s appeal. The victim’s proviso has no such gate. The Supreme Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752 held that the proviso confers a substantive right exercisable without leave, and that the right is triggered by the date of the acquittal once the 2009 amendment was in force.

The Court went further in Joseph Stephen v. Santhanasamy, (2022) 14 SCC 1, treating the proviso as a standalone provision. That word, standalone, is the crux: the victim’s right is not controlled by the State-appeal machinery in Section 378 (now 419), but lives independently in the proviso, with its own forum and its own no-leave character.

Is the right absolute or conditional, then? It is unconditional as to leave: you do not need permission. It is conditional only as to forum and limitation, which are procedural, not gatekeeping.

Is the proviso standalone or controlled by Section 378/419? The honest answer is that there was a genuine debate, with some early views suggesting the victim’s appeal had to borrow the special-leave requirement from the State-appeal provisions. Joseph Stephen closed that debate: the proviso stands on its own feet, and importing a leave requirement would defeat the very right Parliament created.

Every court that confirmed it

What makes the no-leave rule so reliable now is that High Court after High Court has confirmed it, not just the Supreme Court. The Rajasthan High Court applied it in Mastan Singh v. Shyam Sunder Sharma, 2024:RJ-JD:42493, holding that a victim appeals without special leave even though a mere complainant still needs it. The Delhi High Court echoed it in Oasis Tours India Pvt. Ltd. v. Jagdamba Tour Trek Pvt. Ltd., describing the proviso as creating “an additional forum of challenge” open to the victim without leave.

The Kerala High Court did the same in Soumya Gopal v. State of Kerala, 2026:KER:1470, the 2026 ruling from our opening story, confirming that a victim, complainant or not, appeals without leave of court. Think of it this way: when the Supreme Court and at least three High Courts across different regions say the same thing, the question is no longer open. A bench that tried to reintroduce a leave requirement would be swimming against settled authority.

In practice, the only people still asking a victim to seek leave are those who have not read past the section heading. The mistake we see most often is counsel filing a “petition for leave to appeal” for a victim out of caution, then losing weeks while the registry queries why a victim is asking for permission the law does not require. File the appeal itself, not a leave petition.

Victim vs complainant vs State: three different appeal routes

Here is the single most confused point in this entire area, and the table below exists to fix it. “Victim”, “complainant”, and “the State” are three different appellants with three different routes, and lumping them together is how good cases get filed badly. Why does the distinction decide the outcome? Because one route needs leave, one does not, and they go to different forums on different clocks.

The victim’s proviso route vs the complainant’s special-leave route

The victim travels the Section 413 proviso route: no leave, appeal to the ordinary appellate forum. The complainant who is not a victim travels the Section 419(4) of the BNSS, 2023 route (the successor to Section 378(4) CrPC), which requires the High Court’s special leave before the appeal can be entertained. Same acquittal, two very different doors. And the choice of door is not the client’s to make: it is dictated by whether the client is a victim or a bare complainant.

When does a victim use a revision under Section 438 BNSS instead of an appeal? Revision is the narrower, discretionary remedy for jurisdictional error or illegality, not a re-hearing on facts. If a victim has a full appeal under Section 413, that is the stronger route; revision is a fallback where the appeal does not lie or has been foreclosed. A victim’s right to be heard runs through several BNSS stages, much like the victim’s right to be heard, as in plea bargaining under the BNSS, but the appeal against acquittal is the sharpest of those rights.

The State’s appeal against acquittal, and why a victim no longer waits for the prosecutor

The State’s route runs through Section 419 of the BNSS, 2023, with the Public Prosecutor as the appellant. For decades this was the only meaningful path against an acquittal, which meant a victim’s fate depended entirely on whether the prosecutor chose to act.

Must a victim now engage the Public Prosecutor at all? No. The victim appeals independently, in the victim’s own name, through the victim’s own counsel.

[SECOND-ORDER] That independence is quietly reshaping courtroom dynamics. Based on what we have seen, the Public Prosecutor’s old monopoly over acquittal challenges is eroding, and defence counsel increasingly face a motivated private appellant rather than a routine, under-resourced State appeal. A victim who has hired competent counsel will press an acquittal appeal harder than an overloaded prosecutor’s office ever did, which changes how the defence must prepare for the appellate stage.

Who files what, then? The State files under Section 419 through the prosecutor; the victim files under the Section 413 proviso, alone; the non-victim complainant files under Section 419(4) with special leave. Three appellants, three provisions, and they can even coexist in the same matter, with the State and the victim both challenging the same acquittal on overlapping grounds.

Which court do you file in: the forum trap

If there is one error that recurs across the reported decisions, it is this: victims keep filing in the wrong court. The right is real, the leave point is settled, and then the appeal lands in the High Court when it should have gone to the Court of Session. Why does this keep happening, and how do you avoid it?

The forum rule, step by step

The proviso ties the forum to the appellate court that would ordinarily hear an appeal against the conviction of the trial court. Joseph Stephen v. Santhanasamy, (2022) 14 SCC 1 spelled out that the appeal lies to the forum specified in the proviso, not to a forum of the victim’s choosing. The rule resolves into two clean steps.

If a Magistrate’s court passed the acquittal, the victim’s appeal lies to the Court of Session. If a Court of Session passed the acquittal, the victim’s appeal lies to the High Court. There is no leave at either level, and the trial that produced the acquittal usually traces back to how the charge sheet under BNSS sets the trial in motion.

The forum follows the level of the acquitting court, full stop. But knowing the rule and applying it under deadline pressure are two different things, which is why the wrong-court error is so common.

How do you decide between the Sessions Court and the High Court? Look only at who acquitted. Most acquittals, including the bulk of cheque-bounce matters, come from Magistrates, which means most victim appeals belong in the Court of Session, not the High Court. That single fact, that the High Court is usually the wrong door, is what the forum trap is about.

What happens when you file in the wrong court

So you filed in the High Court for a Magistrate’s acquittal. Now what? The appeal is liable to be returned or dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and you refile in the Court of Session.

Mastan Singh v. Shyam Sunder Sharma, 2024:RJ-JD:42493 is instructive: the appeal had been filed in the High Court, and the court permitted refiling in the Sessions Court within a short window. Soumya Gopal v. State of Kerala, 2026:KER:1470 reinforced that a victim must approach the competent appellate forum and cannot bypass it by going to the High Court directly.

Fair warning: the refiling is not automatic forgiveness. By the time the wrong-court appeal is returned, the limitation period for the correct forum may well have run, which means you are now arguing condonation of delay on top of everything else. The pitfall compounds: wrong forum, lost time, then a condonation fight you could have avoided by filing correctly on day one.

A common practical question is whether the period spent litigating in the wrong court counts in the appellant’s favour. Courts have shown willingness to condone delay where the victim moved promptly and the error was bona fide, but willingness is not a right. The safe course, and our recommendation, is to identify the acquitting court first, file in its appellate forum, and never treat the High Court as a default.

The limitation conundrum: how long do you have, and can delay be condoned?

This is the genuinely unsettled corner of Section 413. The proviso grants the right but prescribes no period within which to exercise it, and the High Courts have not landed on a single answer. How long do you actually have? The honest reply is: it depends on which High Court’s territory you are in, so file early and assume the shorter clock.

Why there is no period in the proviso, and the High Court split

Is any limitation period prescribed in the proviso to Section 413 (or the old Section 372)? No. The proviso is silent, which forced the courts to import a period from somewhere, and that is where they diverged.

Some High Courts read in the Limitation Act, 1963 period that applies to appeals against acquittal, treating the victim’s appeal like any other criminal appeal on time. Others, notably in the Bombay and Gujarat lines of reasoning, have spoken of a 90-day or “reasonable period” approach rather than a rigid Limitation Act number.

This is the same numeric-period confusion that runs through other BNSS timelines: the 60-versus-90-day tension here echoes the same 60-vs-90-day split that dogs default bail under the BNSS. Do the clocks differ as between victim, complainant, and State? They can: the State’s appeal carries its own Limitation Act period, the complainant’s special-leave route has its own application timeline, and the victim’s appeal sits in this unsettled space. Treating all three as identical is a recipe for missing a deadline.

How condonation of delay works, and where this is heading

Can the delay in filing a victim’s appeal be condoned? Yes. Where a period is read in, the court can condone delay on sufficient cause shown, the familiar standard from condonation practice generally. The victim files the appeal together with an application explaining the delay, and the court weighs the explanation against the prejudice to the acquitted accused, who by now enjoys a confirmed acquittal.

The practical advice is simple and we will not dress it up: file early, well inside 60 days, and do not gamble on the longer “reasonable period” view holding in your court. If you are already late, file anyway and plead condonation candidly; courts are more forgiving of an honest, prompt-after-discovery delay than of a casual one.

[FUTURE] Where is this heading? Early signals suggest the split cannot survive indefinitely. Practitioners expect either a Supreme Court reference to fix a uniform limitation for victim appeals, or a clarificatory BNSS amendment that writes a clear period into Section 413 itself. Until that happens, the safe assumption remains the shorter clock, because no advocate wants to test the boundaries of “reasonable” with a client’s only appeal.

Can a cheque-bounce (NI Act Section 138) complainant appeal an acquittal?

This is where the abstract right meets enormous real-world demand. Cheque-dishonour prosecutions under the Negotiable Instruments Act run into the lakhs across Indian courts, and acquittals are common. So when the cheque-bounce complaint fails, can the payee appeal as a “victim”? Increasingly, yes, and that answer is reshaping cheque-bounce practice.

Why a Section 138 payee is a “victim”

A payee whose Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 complaint ends in the accused’s acquittal has suffered a financial loss, the dishonoured amount, caused by the offence charged. And that loss is exactly what the victim definition covers. The Supreme Court confirmed this in M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran, 2025 INSC 804, holding that a Section 138 complainant who suffered economic loss is a “victim” and may appeal the acquittal under the proviso, without special leave, regardless of being the complainant.

That ruling does real work because it dissolves the old objection that a cheque-bounce payee was “only a complainant” and therefore stuck with the special-leave route. Is a Section 138 complainant treated differently from a victim of a bodily or BNS offence? On the right to appeal, no: financial loss is loss, bodily injury is injury, and both fit Section 2(1)(y). The payee gets the same no-leave appeal as the victim of a violent crime.

The High Courts following it

The High Courts have lined up behind this. Mastan Singh v. Shyam Sunder Sharma, 2024:RJ-JD:42493 held the Section 138 payee a “victim” under Section 2(1)(y) BNSS entitled to appeal before the Sessions Judge without special leave, while a non-victim complainant still needs leave under Section 419(4). Oasis Tours India Pvt. Ltd. v. Jagdamba Tour Trek Pvt. Ltd. followed Celestium Financial expressly, calling the proviso an “additional forum of challenge” for the cheque-dishonour complainant.

[SECOND-ORDER] Now think about the downstream effect most people miss. Because the vast majority of Section 138 trials run before Magistrates, the victim’s appeal lands in the Court of Session, not the High Court. Multiply that across the cheque-bounce docket and you get a coming surge of Section 138 acquittal appeals flowing into Sessions Courts, a docket-load shift that few district courts have geared up for.

The limits on the right: one appeal only, summary dismissal, and re-appreciation of evidence

The victim’s right is powerful, but it is not bottomless. Three limits define its edges, and a victim who misunderstands them sets up false expectations. What can the right not do? It cannot be used twice, it does not guarantee a full hearing, and it does not make overturning an acquittal easy.

An appeal, not appeals: no second appeal

Read the proviso again: a victim has a right to “an appeal”, singular. Gopala Krishnan v. State of Kerala, a Kerala High Court ruling from January 2026, held exactly that: the victim gets one appeal, not a chain of them, and cannot file a second appeal against an order that affirms an acquittal. And once the first appellate court has spoken, the proviso is spent.

Does Section 413 reach acquittals at the preliminary or discharge stage, or only after a full trial? The right is framed around an order of acquittal, which in the ordinary sense follows a trial. A discharge is not the same as an acquittal, and remedies against a discharge or a preliminary-stage order typically run through revision or other channels rather than the Section 413 appeal. Don’t assume the proviso covers every adverse order; it covers acquittals, lesser-offence convictions, and inadequate compensation.

Can it be summarily dismissed? Does the right include the right to prosecute it?

Can a victim’s appeal be thrown out summarily, without a full hearing? Yes, in principle, an appellate court retains the power to dismiss an appeal at the admission stage if it discloses no arguable ground, the same power that applies to appeals generally. The right to file does not guarantee a full merits hearing if the appeal is hopeless on its face.

Does “right to appeal” include the right to actually prosecute it? Yes, and this matters when a victim dies during the process. Khem Singh (Dead) through LRs v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 INSC 1024 held that the right to prefer an appeal includes the right to prosecute it, so that legal heirs may continue a deceased victim’s appeal; reading it otherwise would render the right redundant. That dovetails with the Section 2(1)(y) definition, which expressly brings in the legal heir.

How hard is it to overturn an acquittal?

Let’s be honest about the odds. An appeal against acquittal is the hardest appeal in criminal law to win, harder than an appeal against conviction. Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 laid down the governing principles: the appellate court can re-appreciate the evidence, but it must give full weight to the presumption of innocence, which an acquittal reinforces into what practitioners call a double presumption.

Does the appellate court re-appreciate the evidence? It can, but it will not disturb an acquittal merely because a different view is possible; it interferes only where the trial court’s view is unreasonable or perverse. The victim who expects the appellate court to simply re-weigh the evidence and flip the result is usually disappointed.

If a victim of an offence wants to explore parallel routes where an appeal is weak, remedies such as quashing under Section 528 BNSS address different problems and are not substitutes for the appeal, but they are part of the larger remedial map. Frame the grounds around perversity and material illegality, not mere disagreement, or the appeal goes nowhere.

The CrPC-to-BNSS transition: which code governs your appeal

Here is the question that brought many readers to this page. A trial began years ago under the CrPC, the acquittal came after 1 July 2024, and now the victim wants to appeal: does the CrPC or the BNSS govern? This is the number-one unmet practitioner question, and the answer is more reassuring than the anxiety around it suggests.

The rule for old cases vs acquittals passed after commencement

The BNSS came into force on 1 July 2024, and its repeal-and-savings logic in Section 531 of the BNSS, 2023 governs the handover. Broadly, proceedings, appeals, and applications pending immediately before commencement continue under the old CrPC as if it were not repealed, while fresh steps taken after commencement follow the BNSS. The real question is whether the relevant step was pending on 1 July 2024 or arose after it: that single fact decides which code’s machinery applies.

Which code governs an acquittal passed after 1 July 2024 in an old case? In practice, where the appeal is filed after commencement, the BNSS framework, including Section 413, supplies the procedural route, while the savings clause protects anything already pending. Does the BNSS apply if the FIR or trial began before 1 July 2024? The trial machinery for a part-heard old case is generally preserved under the CrPC by the savings clause, but a victim’s appeal initiated post-commencement is filed in the BNSS world.

Why it rarely changes the outcome

Here’s the reassuring part: it usually does not matter which label you use. Because Section 413 BNSS is pari materia with the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, the no-leave rule, the grounds, and the forum are the same under either code. Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752 also settled that the right is triggered by the date of the acquittal, not the date of the offence, so an acquittal passed today carries the modern right regardless of when the crime occurred.

[HISTORICAL] The Supreme Court’s arc makes the continuity obvious. Mallikarjun Kodagali in 2018 established the no-leave, date-of-acquittal foundation under Section 372; Joseph Stephen v. Santhanasamy, (2022) 14 SCC 1 in 2022 confirmed the proviso as standalone; M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran, 2025 INSC 804 in 2025 extended it to Section 138 payees and expressly bridged Section 372 CrPC and Section 413 BNSS. Three rulings, one continuous right, carried across the code change without a break.

How did the Supreme Court’s position evolve across those three cases? From establishing the right, to insulating it from the State-appeal machinery, to widening who counts as a victim, each step building on the last.

So the practical takeaway is to cite Section 413 BNSS for any appeal filed now, lean on the Section 372 case law as fully applicable, and stop losing sleep over the transition. And the renumbering changed the address, not the right that lives there.

Frequently asked questions

1. What is Section 413 BNSS? Section 413 BNSS states the general rule that no appeal lies except as provided by law, and its proviso gives a victim an independent right to appeal an acquittal, a conviction for a lesser offence, or an order of inadequate compensation. It re-enacts the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. The victim needs no leave of court.

2. Can a victim appeal against an acquittal in India? Yes. Since the 2009 CrPC amendment, and now under Section 413 BNSS, a victim has an independent statutory right to appeal an acquittal without depending on the State. The right is exercised in the victim’s own name, through the victim’s own counsel, in the appropriate appellate forum.

3. Who is a “victim” under Section 2(1)(y) BNSS? A victim is any person who has suffered loss or injury caused by the act or omission for which the accused was charged, and the definition expressly includes the victim’s guardian and legal heir. “Loss” covers financial loss, so companies and cheque-bounce payees can qualify. Being the complainant is not a requirement.

4. Does a victim need leave (special leave) to appeal an acquittal under Section 413 BNSS? No. The Supreme Court and multiple High Courts have confirmed that the victim’s proviso right requires no leave. Leave is the gate for a non-victim complainant’s appeal under Section 419(4), not for a victim’s appeal.

5. On what grounds can a victim file an appeal under Section 413 BNSS? On any one of three grounds: an order acquitting the accused, a conviction for a lesser offence than the one made out, or an order imposing inadequate compensation. These are alternatives, so any single ground is enough. The inadequate-compensation ground lets a victim accept the conviction yet challenge the amount.

6. Can a victim appeal even if the State does not appeal? Yes, and this is the core of the right. The victim’s appeal is independent of the State’s, so a victim can challenge an acquittal even where the Public Prosecutor declines to act. The victim does not have to wait for or persuade the State.

7. Which court hears a victim’s appeal against acquittal? It depends on which court acquitted. If a Magistrate acquitted, the appeal lies to the Court of Session; if a Court of Session acquitted, it lies to the High Court. No leave is required at either level.

8. What is the limitation period for a victim’s appeal against acquittal? The proviso prescribes no period, and the High Courts differ: some apply the Limitation Act period of around 60 days, while others (in the Bombay and Gujarat lines) speak of 90 days or a “reasonable period”. The safe course is to file well within 60 days. Where you are late, file with an application for condonation of delay.

9. Can a victim appeal a conviction for a lesser offence? Yes. If the trial court convicts the accused of a minor offence when the victim contends a graver charge was established, the victim can appeal to have the conviction elevated. This is one of the three express grounds in the proviso.

10. Can a victim appeal inadequate compensation? Yes. A victim can appeal solely on the ground that the compensation ordered against the convicted person is inadequate, even while accepting the conviction. Note this is distinct from a claim under the State’s separate victim-compensation scheme.

11. Does the BNSS apply if the FIR or trial began before 1 July 2024? The savings clause in Section 531 BNSS generally preserves the old CrPC for proceedings pending on 1 July 2024, while steps taken after commencement follow the BNSS. A victim’s appeal filed after commencement is filed under the BNSS framework. Because Section 413 is pari materia with Section 372 CrPC, the result is usually the same either way.

12. Can the delay in filing a victim’s appeal be condoned? Yes. Where a limitation period is read in, the appellate court can condone delay on sufficient cause shown, filed along with the appeal. Courts weigh the explanation against the prejudice to the acquitted accused, so a prompt, candid explanation fares better than a casual one.

13. Can a cheque-bounce (NI Act Section 138) complainant appeal an acquittal as a “victim”? Yes. The Supreme Court has held that a Section 138 payee who suffered financial loss is a “victim” who may appeal an acquittal under the proviso, without special leave, even though the payee was the complainant. Most such appeals lie to the Court of Session because Section 138 trials are usually before Magistrates.

14. Can a victim appeal even if the victim was not the complainant? Yes. Victim status flows from suffering loss or injury from the offence, not from having filed the complaint. A person injured in a State-prosecuted case can appeal an acquittal as a victim even though the FIR was lodged by the police.

15. Is the victim’s appeal right the same as the complainant’s appeal right? No. A victim appeals under the Section 413 proviso without leave, whereas a complainant who is not a victim must obtain special leave under Section 419(4) BNSS (old Section 378(4) CrPC). Misclassifying a victim as a mere complainant pushes the appeal into the slower, leave-dependent route.

16. Can a victim file a second appeal against an order affirming an acquittal? No. The proviso speaks of “an appeal”, not “appeals”, and a Kerala High Court ruling in 2026 held that a victim cannot file a second appeal against an order that affirms an acquittal. The right is exhausted by the first appeal.

17. Does the victim’s appeal right depend on the date of the offence or the date of the acquittal? The date of the acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the right is triggered by when the acquittal is passed, not when the offence occurred, so an acquittal passed today carries the modern right regardless of the age of the case.

18. Can a legal heir continue a deceased victim’s appeal? Yes. The “right to prefer an appeal” includes the right to prosecute it, and the Section 2(1)(y) definition expressly includes the legal heir. The Supreme Court has held that legal heirs may continue a deceased victim’s appeal so the right is not rendered redundant.

References

Case Law

1. M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran, 2025 INSC 804: Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 8 April 2025 (B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.).
2. Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 15 February 2007.
3. Gopala Krishnan v. State of Kerala: Kerala High Court (Bechu Kurian Thomas, J.), judgment dated 10 January 2026. Recent judgment, not yet indexed on Indian Kanoon; see LiveLaw report.
4. Joseph Stephen v. Santhanasamy, (2022) 14 SCC 1: Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 25 January 2022 (M.R. Shah and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.).
5. Khem Singh (Dead) through LRs v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 INSC 1024: Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 22 August 2025 (B.V. Nagarathna and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.).
6. Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752: AIR 2018 SC 5206; Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 12 October 2018 (Madan B. Lokur and Deepak Gupta, JJ.).
7. Mastan Singh v. Shyam Sunder Sharma, 2024:RJ-JD:42493: Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur (Birendra Kumar, J.), judgment dated 18 October 2024.
8. Oasis Tours India Pvt. Ltd. v. Jagdamba Tour Trek Pvt. Ltd.: Delhi High Court (Manoj Kumar Ohri, J.), judgment dated 8 September 2025.
9. Soumya Gopal v. State of Kerala, 2026:KER:1470: Kerala High Court (A. Badharudeen, J.), judgment dated 21 January 2026. Recent judgment, not yet indexed on Indian Kanoon; see LiveLaw report.

Statutes

1. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881: section cited: 138.
2. Limitation Act, 1963: period for appeals against acquittal (read into the silent proviso by some High Courts).
3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: sections cited: 372 (proviso), 2(wa), 378, 378(4).
4. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: sections cited: 2(1)(y), 413, 419, 419(4), 438, 531.

This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance, consult a qualified legal professional.